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ABSTRACT 
 
On Traffic Analysis Attacks and Countermeasures. (December 2005) 
Xinwen Fu, B.S., Xi’an Jiaotong University; 
M.S., University of Science and Technology of China  
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Wei Zhao 
                                 Dr. Riccardo Bettati 
 
Security and privacy have gained more and more attention with the rapid growth and 
public acceptance of the Internet as a means of communication and information 
dissemination. Security and privacy of a computing or network system may be 
compromised by a variety of well-crafted attacks. 
In this dissertation, we address issues related to security and privacy in computer 
network systems. Specifically, we model and analyze a special group of network attacks, 
known as traffic analysis attacks, and develop and evaluate their countermeasures. 
Traffic analysis attacks aim to derive critical information by analyzing traffic over a 
network. We focus our study on two classes of traffic analysis attacks: link-load analysis 
attacks and flow-connectivity analysis attacks.  
Our research has made the following conclusions:  
1. We have found that an adversary may effectively discover link load by passively 
analyzing selected statistics of packet inter-arrival times of traffic flows on a 
network link. This is true even if some commonly used countermeasures (e.g., 
link padding) have been deployed. We proposed an alternative effective 
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countermeasure to counter this passive traffic analysis attack. Our extensive 
experimental results indicated this to be an effective approach.  
2. Our newly proposed countermeasure may not be effective against active traffic 
analysis attacks, which an adversary may also use to discover the link load. We 
developed methodologies in countering these kinds of active attacks.  
3. To detect the connectivity of a flow, an adversary may embed a recognizable 
pattern of marks into traffic flows by interference. We have proposed new 
countermeasures based on the digital filtering technology. Experimental results 
have demonstrated the effectiveness of our method. 
From our research, it is obvious that traffic analysis attacks present a serious 
challenge to the design of a secured computer network system. It is the objective of this 
study to develop robust but cost-effective solutions to counter link-load analysis attacks 
and flow-connectivity analysis attacks. It is our belief that our methodology can provide 
a solid foundation for studying the entire spectrum of traffic analysis attacks and their 
countermeasures. 
  
v 
 
 
 
To my parents, my parents-in-law, my wife, my sisters, and my brother 
 
  
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
It has been almost six years since I started my graduate studies at Texas A&M 
University. When I sit back and think about the people who have influenced and helped 
me to complete this dissertation, I am overwhelmed!  
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Wei Zhao, for recruiting me 
as a student from China about six years ago. It was an extraordinary piece of good 
fortune to have the opportunity to work with him. He has been an ideal advisor in every 
aspect, both in terms of technical advice on my research and in terms of professional 
advice. I am greatly indebted to him for his great concern, strong encouragement, and 
unceasing support in matters inside and outside of academics. My choice of a career path 
has been greatly influenced by him and I hope I can live up to his high standards. 
I benefited greatly from the technical and career advice provided by my co-advisor 
Dr. Riccardo Bettati. Dr. Bettati has been a co-principal investigator on all the projects 
discussed in this dissertation. I am grateful to him for serving on my dissertation 
committee and for the contributions he has made to my research. He has given me 
extremely useful and incisive comments on my research and paper writing and advised 
me how to view a system problem and ask the right questions. 
I would like to thank Dr. A. L. Narasimha Reddy for his involvement and guidance 
as a member of my dissertation committee. I admire his deep insight in the area of 
network systems. His insightful suggestions and constructive criticism of my work have 
inspired me with excellent results. 
  
vii 
Appreciation also goes to Dr. Dmitri Loguinov for his involvement and his guidance 
as a member of my dissertation committee. Interaction with him in and out of his classes 
on networking has greatly helped me to make progress in my research. I learned a lot 
about the hot topics in the reseach of networking when I took his class of “Special 
Topics on Networking”. 
I thank Dr. Nitin Vaidya of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for his 
involvement and guidance as an ex-member of my dissertation committee. He offered 
me many valuable suggestions on my career path development. It now proves that his 
suggestions are right and the best for me. The discussion during our group seminars has 
greatly helped me to start my work on security and networking. 
It is a great pleasure to thank and acknowledge many professors and researchers with 
whom I have worked. Among them, I am especially grateful to Dr. Miaolan Zhang and 
Dr. Xianglin Li of the Graduate School of University of Science and Technology of 
China, my graduate advisors, for their guidance and endless help. Also, I would like to 
thank Dr. Guofang Tu of the Graduate School of University of Science and Technology 
of China for his guidance on my research and strong support. I would like to thank Dr. 
Lawrence Petersen, Dr. Bart Childs, and Dr. Don Friesen for their suggestions and 
support on my teaching and career path choice.  
My fellow graduate students in the real-time and security system group have made 
countless hours in the office enjoyable. I have benefited greatly from working with Dr. 
Yong Guan, Dr. Dong Xuan, Dr. Shu Jiang, Bryan Graham, Hongyun Xu, and Ye Zhu 
on anonymity and information assurance; Dr. Bo Sun, Dr. Bin Lu, Dr. Jianfeng Cai, Dr. 
  
viii 
Jian Chen, and Benjamin Collins on wireless security; and Dr. Guangtong Cao on 
distributed systems. I have also had many helpful discussions with faculty members: Mr. 
Willis Marti, Dr. Marina Vannucci, Dr. Udo Pooch, Dr. Hank Walker, and Dr. 
Dianxiang Xu, and students: Dr. Byung-kyu Choi, Liliana Grigoriu, Linli He, 
Shengquan Wang, Zhibin Mai, Jianjia Wu, Dr. Nan Ni, Dr. Sangig Rho, Dr. Jianwen 
Yin, Dr. Yong Xiong, Dr. Yu Zhang, Guobin He, Chunhua Tang, Weimin Zhang, Dr. Di 
Wu, Dr. Hao Yu, Wei Yu, Dan Cheng, and Nan Zhang. 
I would like to express appreciation to Ms. Elena Catalena, Ms. Sherry Escalante, Ms. 
Ms. Patricia M Rudkin, Ms. Kathy Flores, Ms. Susan Spears, Ms. Sandra Morse, and Ms. 
Larisa Archer. In particular, I am deeply grateful to Ms. Archer for kindly helping me 
read through this whole dissertation. Ms. Larisa Archer has been revising most of my 
writing during the last few years and I have learned a lot from her on both written and 
spoken English skills. 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my parents and family. They have been, more 
than anyone else, the reason I have been able to get this far. I would like to express my 
heartfelt appreciation to my wife, Shan Tang, for her selfless love and support that has 
made me want to excel. She has encouraged and helped me in many ways during my 
studies. Words cannot express my gratitude to my parents and parents-in-law, Yumei 
Hou, Kede Fu, Zhenhua Luo, and Shengqi Tang; and to my sisters and brother, Wenhua 
Fu, Wangdi Fu, and Wenge Fu. They all have given me their support and love from 
across the seas. They instilled in me the value of hard work and taught me how to 
overcome life’s disappointments. 
  
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
1.1. Overview of Network Security and Attacks .......................................................1 
1.2. Overview of Traffic Analysis Attacks ................................................................2 
1.3. Summary of This Dissertation Research.............................................................3 
1.4. The Organization of This Dissertation................................................................4 
2. RELATED WORK ......................................................................................................6 
2.1. Related Work for Link-Load Analysis Attacks ..................................................6 
2.2. Related Work for Connectivity Analysis Attacks ...............................................7 
3. PASSIVE LINK-LOAD ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES .10 
3.1. Models...............................................................................................................10 
3.1.1. Network Model ........................................................................................10 
3.1.2. Adversary Model......................................................................................12 
3.2. Overview of Countermeasures to Link-Load Analysis Attacks........................15 
3.3. Performance Metric and Analysis .....................................................................16 
3.3.1. Detection Rate as Performance Metric ....................................................16 
3.3.2. Derivation of Detection Rate ...................................................................19 
3.4. Evaluations ........................................................................................................28 
3.4.1. Experiments in a Laboratory Environment ..............................................29 
3.4.2. Experiments over Campus and Wide Area Networks .............................38 
3.5. Theorem Proof ..................................................................................................42 
3.5.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1 ...............................................................................42 
3.5.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2 ...............................................................................44 
3.5.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3 ...............................................................................52 
3.5.4. Proof of Theorem 3.4 ...............................................................................57 
3.6. Summary ...........................................................................................................59 
4. ACTIVE LINK-LOAD ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES...61 
4.1. Models...............................................................................................................61 
4.1.1. Network Model ........................................................................................61 
4.1.2. Adversary Model......................................................................................61 
4.2. Overview of Countermeasures to Link-Load Analysis Attacks........................65 
4.3. Performance Metric and Analysis .....................................................................65 
4.3.1. Detection Rate as Performance Metric ....................................................65 
  
x 
Page 
4.3.2. Derivation of Detection Rate ...................................................................67 
4.4. Evaluations ........................................................................................................71 
4.4.1. Experiments in a Laboratory Environment ..............................................72 
4.4.2. Experiments over Campus and Wide Area Networks .............................81 
4.5. Theorem Proof ..................................................................................................85 
4.5.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1 ...............................................................................85 
4.5.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2 ...............................................................................87 
4.5.3. Proof of Theorem 4.3 ...............................................................................89 
4.5.4. Proof of Theorem 4.4 ...............................................................................97 
4.5.5. Proof of Theorem 4.5 .............................................................................102 
4.6. Summary .........................................................................................................106 
5. CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES.........108 
5.1. Models.............................................................................................................109 
5.1.1. Mix Network ..........................................................................................109 
5.1.2. Wireless Networks .................................................................................113 
5.1.3. Wireless Mix Network ...........................................................................114 
5.1.4. Adversary Model....................................................................................115 
5.2. Flow Marking Attack ......................................................................................115 
5.2.1. Overview and Problem Definition .........................................................116 
5.2.2. Issues of Flow Marking Attack..............................................................117 
5.3. Mark Embedding and Traffic Interception......................................................117 
5.3.1. Overview of Radio Frequency Communication ....................................118 
5.3.2. Interfering with and Intercepting Wireless Communication..................118 
5.4. Mark Recognition by Feature Frequency........................................................120 
5.4.1. Effective and Efficient Marks ................................................................120 
5.4.2. Flow Marking Attack Framework..........................................................121 
5.4.3. Detection Rate as Evaluation Criterion..................................................125 
5.4.4. Selection of Interference Interval and Sampling Interval ......................126 
5.5. Evaluation of Flow Marking Attack ...............................................................127 
5.5.1. Experiment Environment .......................................................................128 
5.5.2. Failure of Mix Networks under FMA ....................................................129 
5.5.3. Detection Rate vs. Different Wireless Links .........................................133 
5.5.4. Sample Length to Achieve Detection Rate of 95% ...............................134 
5.5.5. Impact of Noise Traffic..........................................................................135 
5.6. Countermeasures by Filtering .........................................................................137 
5.6.1. Overview................................................................................................137 
5.6.2. Selection of Filter Coefficients ..............................................................138 
5.6.3. Evaluation of Filter-based Countermeasure...........................................139 
5.7. Summary .........................................................................................................140 
  
xi 
Page 
6. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................141 
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................143 
VITA ..............................................................................................................................149 
  
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
              Page 
Figure 1. Network Model .................................................................................................11 
Figure 2. Flow Marking Attack Framework ....................................................................13 
Figure 3. Bayes Decision Making for the Case of Two Payload Traffic Rates ...............18 
Figure 4. Experiment Setup in Laboratory for Passive Attacks .......................................30 
Figure 5. CIT Padding with Zero Cross Traffic ...............................................................33 
Figure 6. VIT Padding - Detection Rate vs. Sample Size ................................................35 
Figure 7. Empirical Detection Rate with Cross Traffic in Laboratory.............................36 
Figure 8. Experiment Setup over Campus and the Internet for Passive Attacks..............40 
Figure 9. Empirical Detection Rate for Passive Attacks over Campus and Internet .......41 
Figure 10. Experiment Setup in Laboratory for Active Attacks ......................................73 
Figure 11. Detection Rate for Stable Payload Traffic ......................................................75 
Figure 12. Detection Rate for Periodical Systems ...........................................................77 
Figure 13. Tracking of the Changing Pattern of the User Payload Traffic Rate..............78 
Figure 14. Detection Rate by RTT of Delayed Ping Packets with Zero Cross Traffic ....80 
Figure 15. Experiment Setup over Campus and Internet for Active Attacks...................82 
Figure 16. Empirical Detection Rate for Active Attacks over Campus and Internet.......84 
Figure 17. Mix Network.................................................................................................110 
Figure 18. Flow Marking Attack Scenario.....................................................................117 
Figure 19. Bayes Decision Rule for Flow Marking Attack............................................125 
Figure 20. Experiment Setup..........................................................................................128 
  
xiii 
              Page 
Figure 21. Power Spectrum of 802.11 DSSS Traffic for Stop-and-go Mix...................130 
Figure 22. Detection Rate by Flow Marking Attack......................................................131 
Figure 23. Detection Rate for Different Types of Wireless Links .................................133 
Figure 24.  Sample Length Required to Achieve Detection Rate of 95%......................134 
Figure 25. Detection Rate vs. Noise Traffic...................................................................136 
Figure 26. Detection Rate with Filter-based Countermeasure .......................................139 
 
  
xiv 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
              Page 
Table 1. Batching Strategies...........................................................................................113 
  
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview of Network Security and Attacks 
As the use of computer networks, especially the Internet, has become widespread, the 
concept of computer security and privacy has expanded to denote issues pertaining to the 
networked use of computers and their resources. Thousands of successful break-ins over 
the years illustrate that we need to evaluate security of systems systematically, study and 
understand attack techniques, and then develop corresponding countermeasures. 
Security attacks can be classified into two classes: active and passive. In active 
attacks, an attacker changes, hence targeting damages directly. For example, network 
messages can be altered, and web service can be denied by active attacks. In passive 
attacks, an attacker simply listens or eavesdrops without actively changing anything. 
Examples of passive attacks in daily life and compute domain are shoulders-surfing (i.e., 
observing displays and keystrokes over someone's shoulder), telephone tapping, and 
wireless sniffing. Obviously, it is more difficult to detect passive attacks than active ones.  
To deal with these attacks, a variety of countermeasures have been developed, and 
they can be classified as either offensive or defensive. By offensive countermeasures, we 
mean that defenders act on attacks (aimed at the sensitive targets), and intend to actively 
stop operations of the adversary. For example, the widely used free-source intrusion 
detection and response system snort [1] is an example of the offensive countermeasure. 
 
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Computers. 
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It can monitor live traffic on a network, use a rule engine to identify patterns within 
traffic, and take actions such as filtering out the identified attacking traffic. When 
referring to defensive countermeasures, we mean that defenders hide the sensitive target 
and passively deny or limit an enemy’s ability to access it. Encryption is an example of a 
defensive countermeasure.  
In this dissertation, we model and analyze a special class of attacks, namely traffic 
analysis attacks, which can be either active or passive, and develop and evaluate 
countermeasures to them.  
1.2.  Overview of Traffic Analysis Attacks 
Traffic analysis attacks are aimed at deriving critical information by analyzing the 
statistics of traffic flows. For example, in a military communication network, by 
intercepting traffic using sniffing tools and monitoring pattern change of link load, an 
adversary may uncover the location of command centers, determine the state of alertness 
of various units, and/or detect covert information flows to or from apparently non-
involved parties.  
Traffic analysis attacks challenge the design of traditional systems where encryption 
is typically used as the main method for protecting security and privacy. However, it is 
obvious that encryption cannot protect many other important characteristics of traffic 
which may be mission critical and require protection. 
We consider two types of traffic analysis attacks. The first is link-load analysis 
attack that aims at discovering traffic rate on a network link. The second is flow-
connectivity attack that intends to discover flow connectivity between two hosts.  Link 
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load and flow connectivity in many applications are considered mission critical 
information and should be protected. We will develop and evaluate countermeasures 
against these two types of attacks from revealing link load and flow connectivity. 
1.3. Summary of This Dissertation Research 
As mentioned earlier, we are dealing with traffic analysis attacks and their 
countermeasures. In particular, we focus on link-load analysis attacks and connectivity 
analysis attacks, as defined above.  
For each kind of attack, we assume that an attacker may use either passive or active 
means to launch attacks. We formally propose adversary models and define performance 
metrics based on which effectiveness and efficiency of attacks and countermeasures can 
be evaluated. We will systematically analyze existing countermeasures and identify their 
weaknesses. Based on our studies of the existing solutions, we will develop and evaluate 
new countermeasures aimed at overcoming problems associated with current solutions.  
In this dissertation research, we have obtained the following promising results:  
1. An adversary may effectively discover link load by passively analyzing statistics 
of packet inter-arrival times of traffic flows passing through a network link. This 
is true even if some commonly used countermeasures such as link padding have 
been deployed. We proposed an alternative effective countermeasure to counter 
this kind of passive link-load analysis attack. 
2. Our newly proposed countermeasure may not be effective against active traffic 
analysis attacks, which an adversary may also use to discover the link load. We 
propose to develop methodologies in countering these kinds of active attacks.  
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3. To detect the connectivity of a flow, an adversary may invoke active attacks over 
the flow traffic and embed a recognizable pattern of marks into the flow traffic. 
We proposed new countermeasures based on digital filtering technology. Initial 
results have demonstrated the effectiveness of our method. 
In dealing with both link-load analysis attacks and connectivity analysis attacks, we 
measure the degree of system security by detection rate, which is defined as the 
probability that an adversary discovers the target information. For a link-load analysis 
attack, the needed information is the link load while for a connectivity analysis attack; 
the target information is the flow connectivity between hosts. We derive analytical 
formulas of detection rates for both attacks.  
Furthermore, we carry out extensive experiments on both local and wide area 
networks for the two classes of attacks and their countermeasures. The objective of these 
experiments is to validate the correctness of our theoretical analysis.  
In summary, in this dissertation, we model and analyze a few traffic analysis attacks, 
and develop and evaluate corresponding countermeasures. We hope that our 
methodology will provide a solid foundation for studying the entire spectrum of traffic 
analysis attacks and their countermeasures. 
1.4. The Organization of This Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related work. 
In Section 3, we discuss passive link-load analysis attacks and their countermeasures. In 
Section 4, we discuss active link-load analysis attacks and their countermeasures. In 
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Section 5, we discuss flow-connectivity analysis attacks and the filter-based 
countermeasures. We summarize this dissertation research in Section 6. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
2.1. Related Work for Link-Load Analysis Attacks 
Generally speaking, perfect secrecy theory by Shannon [2] is the foundation for the ideal 
countermeasure system against statistical analysis attacks. Researchers have proposed 
and analyzed various countermeasures and intended to realize or approximate the perfect 
secrecy model in one form or another. 
Baran [3] suggests adding dummy (fraudulent) traffic to conceal the true amount of 
traffic. A survey of countermeasures for traffic analysis is given in [4]. To mask the 
frequency, length and origin-destination patterns of an end-to-end communication, 
dummy messages are used to pad the traffic to a predefined pattern. It is evident that 
such a predefined pattern is sufficient but not necessary based on the perfect secrecy 
theory.  
Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman [5][6][7] give a mathematical framework to 
optimize the bandwidth usage while preventing traffic analysis of the end-to-end traffic 
rates. Timmerman [8] proposes an adaptive traffic hiding model to reduce the overhead 
caused by traffic padding, in which the link padding rate is reduced along with the 
decrease of real traffic rate. Kung, Cheng, Tan, and Bradner [9] use a similar approach, 
denoted as on demand traffic padding, which will generate dummy traffic only when the 
payload traffic is present. These approaches render large-scale variations in traffic rates 
still observable. 
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Researchers at Texas A&M University have developed NetCamo [10], which 
provides the end-to-end prevention of traffic analysis while guaranteeing QoS (the worst 
case delay of message flows) in time constraint communication networks. Song, Wagner, 
and Tian [11] analyze how SSH 1 and SSH 2 can leak user passwords under a passive 
traffic analysis attack and propose using traffic padding to counter the attack. 
The above mentioned previous studies focus on applications utilizing the commonly 
used traffic padding approach to counter traffic analysis attacks. In this dissertation, we 
will evaluate the security level a traffic padding approach can provide and design new 
effective countermeasures. 
2.2. Related Work for Connectivity Analysis Attacks 
To protect the anonymity of email transmissions, Chaum [12] proposes the use of Mixes. 
Many researchers suggest using CIT padding between a user and the first mix [13]. 
Raymond in [14] gives an informal survey of several ad hoc traffic analysis attacks on 
systems providing anonymous services. One of his conclusions is that traffic padding is 
essential to achieving communication anonymity. Back, Möller, and Stiglic [15] list 
many possible attacks in Freedom anonymous communication system [16]. Danezis, 
Dingledine, and Mathewson [17] give a list of attacks to anonymity systems. Most of 
those attacks are only briefly discussed and lack systematic analysis. Freedman and 
Morris developed Tarzan [18], which provides anonymity in a peer-to-peer environment 
by using link padding to counter possible attacks. 
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The concept of continuous-time mix is introduced by Danezis in [19]. He proves that 
the optimal mix strategy that maximizes anonymity is the Exponential Mix, i.e. a Stop-
and-Go Mix that delays packets individually according to an exponential distribution. 
Kong and Hong [20] develop an anonymity protocol for wireless ad-hoc networks. 
When Alice tries to communicate with Bob, by broadcasting encrypted route discovery 
messages recursively, she can find a route to Bob, who responds to the request through 
the reverse path. Thus an anonymity path is built from Alice to Bob. The authors and 
other researchers also mention using broadcast MAC addresses to achieve more 
protection. But the whole protocol is still susceptible to the flow marking attack. 
Sun, Simon, Wang, and Russell [21], and Hintz [22] give quantitative performance 
analysis for an anonymous web server that uses encryption and packet header mangling 
such as in a NAT proxy. The analysis takes advantage of the fact that a number of HTTP 
features, such as the number and size of objects, can be used as signatures to identify 
web pages with some accuracy. Unless the web anonymizer addresses this issue, these 
signatures are visible to the adversary. Serjantov and Sewell [23] analyze the possibility 
of a lone flow along an input link of a mix in peer-to-peer anonymity systems. If the rate 
of this lone input flow is approximately equal to the rate of a flow out of the mix, this 
pair of input and outflow flows is correlated. 
Guan, Fu, Bettati, and Zhao [24] define an entropy-based metric to evaluate the 
anonymity degree of an anonymity system. They consider attacks where compromised 
nodes cooperate to correlate packets passing those nodes and find the sender of a packet. 
Many works in the related literature study this kind of packet-level attack. In this 
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dissertation, we consider flow-level attacks which may be more flexible and dangerous. 
We also study their countermeasures. 
To find if a party (Bob) is communicating with another party (Alice) an adversary 
may measure the similarity between Bob's outbound traffic and Alice's inbound traffic. 
Zhu, Fu, Graham, Bettati, and Zhao [25] propose using mutual information for the 
similarity measurement. Levine, Reiter, Wang, and Wright [26] use cross correlation to 
measure similarity between flows. Both papers consider passive traffic analysis attacks 
against flow connectivity, while we discuss a class of active traffic analysis attacks 
which may be more flexible and dangerous. 
Serjantov and Peter [23] and some other researchers mention very briefly that an 
adversary may introduce a spike into traffic to find the communication relationship 
between users, but without any in-depth study of how to introduce spikes, what kind of 
spike should be introduced, or how to recognize the spike. We generalize this kind of 
attack in wired and wireless networks and build a complete framework to answer the 
above questions. 
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3. PASSIVE LINK-LOAD ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of link padding, which can be used as a 
countermeasure against passive link load analysis attacks. We first present the network 
model, padding mechanism, and adversary strategy. We then develop a theoretical 
model and derive closed-form formulae for detection rates. Finally, we validate results 
from the theoretical model by experiments.  
3.1. Models 
In this section, we present the model of the network in our study and then formally 
define the model of the adversary, which uses statistical pattern recognition strategies for 
traffic analysis attacks. 
3.1.1. Network Model 
In this work, we assume that the network consists of protected subnets, which are 
interconnected by unprotected networks. It is assumed that traffic within protected 
subnets is shielded from observers. Unprotected networks can be either public networks 
(e.g., the Internet) or networks that are deployed over an easily accessible broadcast 
medium. These networks are accessible to observation by third-parties and are, therefore, 
open to traffic analysis. This model captures a variety of situations, ranging from 
battleship convoys (where the large-scale shipboard networks are protected and the inter-
ship communication is wireless) to communicating Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) 
(where the protected networks consist of single nodes). 
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 Figure 1 illustrates the setup of the network in this study. Two security gateways 
GWA and GWB are placed at the two boundaries of the unprotected network and provide 
the link padding necessary to prevent traffic analysis of the payload traffic exchanged 
between the protected subnets A and B.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Network Model 
 
 
 Note that the gateways can be realized as either stand-alone boxes, modules on 
routers or switches, software additions to network stacks, or device drivers at the end 
hosts1. In this section, we assume that gateways are stand-alone boxes. Nevertheless, the 
analysis in this section should also be valid for other implementations. To simplify the 
discussion, the communication is one-way from Subnet A to Subnet B. Consequently, 
GWA and GWB are also called sender gateway and receiver gateway, respectively.  
                                                 
1
 This is the case when end users of onion-routing-like anonymity systems choose to use link padding. 
Subnet B Subnet A 
network Alice Bob 
GWA GWB 
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3.1.2. Adversary Model 
The goal of the adversary is to perform traffic analysis and infer critical characteristics 
of the payload traffic exchanged between protected subnets over the unprotected 
network. We assume that the adversary is only interested in the payload traffic rate, that 
is, the rate at which payload traffic is exchanged between protected networks. As 
mentioned earlier, the traffic rate is an important piece of information in many mission-
critical communication applications [14]. Specifically, we assume that there is a set of 
discrete payload traffic rates {ω1, …, ωm}} The rate of payload traffic from the sender 
will be one of those _ rates at a given time. Consequently, the objective of the adversary is 
to identify at which of these _ rates the payload is being sent. 
 We assume that to identify at which rate the payload is being transmitted, the 
adversary limits himself to passive attacks, i.e., observations of the traffic. In addition, 
the adversary’s access to the system is limited to the unprotected networks. The 
protected subnets and hosts within are not accessible. Neither is the link padding 
infrastructure. This means that, in Figure 1, the adversary can only tap somewhere 
between gateways GWA and GWB. 
 We also assume that the adversary has complete knowledge about the gateway 
machines and the countermeasure algorithms used for preventing traffic analysis. For 
example, the adversary can simulate the whole system, including the gateway machines, 
to obtain a priori knowledge about traffic behavior. In many studies on information 
security, it is a convention that we make worst case assumptions, such as this one. 
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 Based on these assumptions, the adversary can deploy a strategy based on Bayes 
decision theory [27]. The entire attack strategy consists of two phases: the offline 
training phase and the online classification phase as shown in Figure 2. We will describe 
these below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow Marking Attack Framework 
 
 
The offline training phase in Figure 2 (a) can be decomposed into the following steps: 
1. Collecting training data: The adversary reconstructs the entire link padding 
system and collects timing information at different payload traffic rates.  
(1)  
Collect 
training data 
(3)  
Select feature 
from preprocessed 
training data 
 
(4)  
Select 
decision rule  
 
(2)  
Preprocess 
training data 
 
 
(1)  
Collect 
realistic data 
(3)  
Extract feature 
from preprocessed 
realistic data 
 
(4)  
Make a 
decision 
 
(2)  
Preprocess 
realistic data 
 
(a) Offline Training Phase  
(b) Online Recognition Phase  
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2. Preprocessing training data: From packet timing information, the adversary 
derives the Packet Inter-Arrival Time (PIAT) of the traffic. 
3. Selecting feature from preprocessed training data: The adversary selects a 
statistical feature of the Packet Inter-Arrival Time (PIAT) that will be used for 
traffic rate classification. Possible features we study in this section are sample 
mean, sample variance, and sample entropy. The adversary then derives the 
Probability Density Functions (PDF) of the selected statistical feature. As 
histograms are usually too coarse for the distribution estimation, we assume that 
the adversary uses the Gaussian kernel estimator of PDF [28], which is effective 
in our problem domain. 
4. Selecting decision rule: Based on the PDFs of statistical features for different 
payload traffic rates, Bayes decision rules are derived. Recall that possible 
payload traffic rates are ω1, …, ωm. The Bayes decision rule can be stated as 
follows: 
The sample represented by feature “s”  corresponds to payload rateωi  if 
[ ] ( ) ( )sPsPmj ji ωω ≥∈∀ ,,1  (3.1) 
That is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jjii PsfPsf ωωωω ≥  (3.2) 
where f(s|ωi) is the PDF of feature s conditioned on payload traffic rateωi,  P(ωi) is the a 
priori probability that the payload traffic is sent at rateωi, and P(ωi|s) is the post priori 
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probability that the payload traffic is sent at rateωi  when the collected sample has the 
measured feature s. 
Once the adversary completes its training phase, she can perform the classification at 
run time. We assume the adversary uses some means to tap the network between 
gateways GWA and GWB. In particular, when she wants to determine the current payload 
rate, the adversary collects a sample of packet inter-arrival times. She calculates the 
value of the statistical feature from the collected sample, and then uses the Bayes 
decision rules derived in the training phase to match the collected sample to one of the 
previously defined payload traffic rates. 
3.2. Overview of Countermeasures to Link-Load Analysis Attacks 
We now discuss mechanisms that can be used as a countermeasure for traffic analysis 
attacks.  
 One way to counter the traffic analysis attacks is to “pad” the payload traffic, that is, 
to properly insert “dummy” packets in the payload traffic stream so that the real payload 
status is camouflaged. Link padding algorithms can be implemented in various ways 
over the two gateways in Figure 1. The most common method is to use a timer to control 
the packet transmission. It works as follows: On GWA, incoming payload packets from 
the sender are placed in a queue. An interrupt-driven timer is set up on GWA. When the 
timer fires, the interrupt processing routine checks whether there is a payload packet in 
the queue. If there is a payload packet, one is removed from the queue and transmitted to 
GWB. Otherwise, a dummy packet is transmitted to GWB. 
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 We need to make a few remarks before we proceed further. In this section, we 
assume that packet contents are perfectly encrypted (e.g., by IPSec with appropriate 
options) and are, thus, non-observable. In particular, the adversary cannot distinguish 
between payload packets and “dummy” packets used for padding. 
It is obvious from the implementation described above, the only tunable parameter is 
the time interval between timer interrupts. The choice of this parameter discriminates 
different padding approaches. A system is said to have a constant interval timer (CIT) if 
the timer is a periodic one, i.e., the interval between two consecutive timer interrupts is 
constant. This is the most common method used for padding. On the other hand, a 
system is said to have a variable interval timer (VIT) if the interval between two 
consecutive timer interrupts is a random variable that satisfies some distribution. As we 
will see in the later part of this section, CIT and VIT systems may perform significantly 
differently in preventing traffic analysis attacks. 
We assume that all packets have a constant size. Thus, observing the packet size will 
not provide any useful information to the adversary. The only information available for 
the adversary to observe and analyze is the timing of packets. 
3.3. Performance Metric and Analysis 
3.3.1. Detection Rate as Performance Metric 
Given the models described in the previous section, we would like to evaluate the system 
security in terms of detection rate. Detection rate is defined as the probability that the 
adversary can correctly identify the payload traffic rate. In this section, we derive the 
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closed-form formulae for detection rates when the adversary uses sample mean, sample 
variance, or sample entropy, as the statistical feature, respectively. Our formulae will be 
approximate due to the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless, these formulae do 
correctly reflect the impact of various system parameters, including the type of padded 
traffic, sample size, and statistical feature used. These relationships are extremely useful 
in design of a link padding system so that the overall detection rate can be minimized. In 
the next section, we will see that experimental data matches well to the performance 
predicted by our approximation formulae. 
 We will focus our discussion on systems with only two payload traffic rates, namely 
the low traffic rate and the high traffic rate and assume that both traffic rates occur with 
equal probability. It is trivial to extend this work to complicated cases. 
 Figure 3 shows the PDFs of the statistical features conditioned on two alternative 
payload traffic rates ωl and ωh. Let d be the solution of the equation  
( ) ( )hl sfsf ωω =  (3.3) 
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Figure 3. Bayes Decision Making for the Case of Two Payload Traffic Rates 
 
 
We assume that there is a unique solution to the equation. Consequently, the Bayes 
decision rule now becomes: If s ≤ d, the payload traffic rate is ωl. Otherwise, the rate is 
ωh. The error rate for the Bayes decision rule can be calculated as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∞−
∞
+=
d
hh
d
ll dssfPdssfP ωωωωε  (3.4) 
The detection rate is then given by 
v  =  ε−1  (3.5) 
 =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∞
∞−
+
d
hh
d
ll dssfPdssfP ωωωω  (3.6) 
d
s
( ) ( )hh spP ωω |( ) ( )ll spP ωω |
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While numerical methods can be applied to calculate the detection rates, (e.g. with the 
use of (3.2)), our goal here is to derive close-form formulae that can reveal the 
relationship between the detection rate and other system parameters. 
3.3.2. Derivation of Detection Rate 
3.3.2.1. Decomposition of Packet Inter-Arrival Time 
Recall that the adversary collects a sample of PIATs at run time in order to perform the 
classification. Thus, to derive the detection rate, we need to formally model the PIAT. 
For a given system, let random variable X be the PIAT. X can be considered as the sum 
of three other random variables: 
netgwTX δδ ++=  (3.7) 
where T  is the designed interval of two consecutive timer interrupts for the timer, and 
δgw and δnet reflect the noise added by disturbance in the gateway system and by 
congestion in the network, respectively. 
 Note that T is defined by the link padding policy. T should be constant for CIT link 
padding but follows a specific distribution for VIT link padding. 
 δgw is caused by a number of factors, which may impact the accuracy of the timer’s 
interrupt. First, the context switching from other running process to the timer’s interrupt 
routine may take indeterminate time. Furthermore, a timer interrupt may be temporally 
blocked due to other activities. For example, if a payload packet from the sender is 
arriving at the network interface card of the gateway, the network interface card would 
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generate an interrupt request, which can block all the processes including the (scheduled) 
timer interrupt2. Thus, the timer’s interrupts may be subtly but randomly delayed by 
incoming payload packets. This implies that the padded traffic’s PIAT may be correlated 
with the payload traffic. 
 δnet captures the disturbance on the padded traffic’s PIAT caused by crossover traffic 
at routers and switches. Clearly, δnet depends on the position at which the adversary 
collects its sample. If the collection is made right at the output of the sender gateway, 
this noise may be ignored. However, if the adversary collects its sample far away from 
the sender gateway, the noise level can be high as crossover traffic may significantly 
interfere with the padded traffic.  
 In this section, we assume that T, δgw  and δnet are normally distributed. These 
assumptions simplify analysis without loss of generality and will be validated by our 
experiments in Section 3.4.1. Specifically, 
( )2,~ TNT στ  (3.8) 
where τ is the mean of the timer timeout interval, and σT2 = 0 in the case of CIT link 
padding. And 
( )2,0~ netnet N σδ  (3.9) 
where σnet2 = 0 when the adversary observes the padded traffic at a position next to the 
sender’s gateway GWA. Similarly 
                                                 
2
 For TimeSys Linux [29] used in our experiments, this request proceeds before the incoming packet 
reaches the IP layer [30]. From that instant on, the network subsystem in the kernel becomes preemptive. 
Other high priority tasks such as the timer interrupt routine can then proceed as scheduled. 
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( )2,0~ gwgw N σδ  (3.10) 
As δgw may be correlated to the payload traffic, we denote σ2gw,l and σ2gw,h as the 
variances of δgw when the payload traffic rate is low and high, respectively. 
Consequently, we denote Xl and _Xh as random variables when the payload traffic rate is 
low and high, respectively. Thus, 
( )2,~ ll NX σµ  (3.11) 
where µ = τ (τ is the mean of the timer timeout interval) and 
2
,
222
lgwnetTl σσσσ ++=  (3.12) 
Similarly, 
( )2,~ hh NX σµ  (3.13) 
where µ = τ and 
2
,
222
hgwnetTh σσσσ ++=  (3.14) 
Here we assume that Xl and _Xh have the same mean. This assumption will be validated 
by our experiments later. 
 For the convenience of the discussion in the rest of this section, we need to introduce 
a ratio defined as follows: 
2
,
22
2
,
22
2
2
lgwnetT
hgwnetT
l
hr
σσσ
σσσ
σ
σ
++
++
==  (3.15) 
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where σT2, σnet2, σgw,l2,and σgw,h2 are defined in (3.8), (3.9), (3.12), and (3.14), 
respectively. The usage of r will become clear when we derive the formulae for 
detection rates for three different statistical features, namely, sample mean, sample 
variance, and sample entropy. 
3.3.2.2. Detection Rate Formula for Sample Mean 
Let {X1, X2, …, Xn} be a random sample of packet inter-arrival times. The sample mean 
is the average of the elements in the sample: 
n
X
X
n
i
i
=
=
1
 
(3.16) 
 
 Note that sample mean X  is a random variable and an unbiased estimation of X’s mean 
µ. 
 The following theorem provides a closed-form formula for estimation of detection 
rate when the adversary uses sample mean as the feature statistic. 
Theorem 3.1: Using sample mean as the classification feature gives rise to an estimated 
detection rate 
( )rrvX +−≈ /12
11  (3.17) 
 
where r  is defined in (3.15). 
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 The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in the first part of Section 3.5.1. From 
Theorem 3.1, the following observations can be made: 
1. The detection rate in (3.17) is independent on sample size n. That is, when 
sample mean is used as feature statistic, changing the sample size has no impact 
on detection rates. 
2. As shown in the second part of Section 3.5.1, the detection rate Xv  is an 
increasing function of r, where r > 1. That is, the smaller r, the lower the 
corresponding detection rate. When r = 1, the detection rate reaches 50%. Note 
that for such a system with two possible payload traffic rates, the detection rate 
for the adversary is lower-bounded at 50% corresponding to random guessing. In 
reality, r = 1 may occur when σT2  is sufficiently large in comparison with σ2gw . 
This corresponds to the case when the VIT padding is used. 
3.3.2.3. Detection Rate Formula for Sample Variance 
Let {X1, X2, …, Xn} be a sample of size n  from the distribution of  random variable X. 
The sample variance Y  is defined as follows 
( )
1
1
2
−
−
=

=
n
mX
Y
n
i
i
 
(3.18) 
 
Note that sample variance Y is a random variable, and an unbiased estimation of X’s 
variance [31]. 
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 Recall that σh2 is the variance of padded traffic’s PIAT conditioned on the high 
payload traffic rate and σl2 the variance of padded traffic’s PIAT conditioned on the low 
payload traffic rate. σh2 is slightly larger than σl2, which is validated by our experiments 
in Section 3.4.1. Based on these observations, the following theorem provides a closed-
form formula for estimation of detection rate when the adversary uses sample variance 
as the feature statistic. 
Theorem 3.2: Using sample variance as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 






−
−≈ 5.0,
1
1max
n
C
v YY  (3.19) 
 
where C is calculated as follows: 
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and r is defined in (3.15). 
 The proof of Theorem 3.2 can be found in the first part of Section 3.5.2. From 
Theorem 3.2, the following observations can be made: 
1. The detection rate vY is an increasing function in terms of sample size n. When 
n→∞, the detection rate is 100%. This means that if the payload traffic lasts for a 
long time at one rate, either low or high, and the adversary obtains such a sample, 
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the adversary may detect the payload traffic rate by using sample variance as a 
statistical feature. 
2. As shown in the second part of Section 3.5.2, the detection rate vY is an 
increasing function of r defined in (3.15), where r ≥ 1. That is, the smaller r, the 
lower the corresponding detection rate. When r = 1, the detection rate is 50%. 
This corresponds to the case of VIT padding with sufficiently large σT2. This 
suggests that although the adversary may use a large sample size to detect the 
payload rate by sample variance, using a VIT padding with a large interval 
variance can make such an attack impossible, since no payload traffic can last 
very long at a fixed rate in practice, and the adversary cannot obtain a sufficiently 
large sample. 
3.3.2.4. Detection Rate Formula for Sample Entropy 
While there are many empirical entropy estimators available, it is generally difficult to 
obtain those estimators’ PDFs. In this work, we take advantage of the relationship 
between entropy and variance of a normal distribution in order to describe sample 
entropy’s effectiveness as the feature statistic. We will then use an empirical robust 
histogram-based entropy estimator for our analysis. The following theorem provides a 
closed-form formula for estimation of detection rate when the adversary uses sample 
entropy as the feature statistic. 
Theorem 3.3: Using sample entropy as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 
  
26 






−≈ 5.0,1max~
n
C
v HH  (3.21) 
where CH  is calculated as follows: 
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and r is defined in (3.15).  
 The proof of Theorem 3.3 can be found in the first part of Section 3.5.3. From 
Theorem 3.3 we can make a similar set of observations to that of the case of sample 
variance. 
1. Detection rate Hv ~  is an increasing function in terms of sample size n. That is, 
when the adversary obtains a larger sample, the detection rate will approach 
100%. 
2. As shown in the second part of Section 3.5.3, the detection rate Hv ~  is an 
increasing function of r defined in (3.15), where r ≥ 1. When r = 1, the detection 
rate reaches 50%. In reality, this may occur when σT2 is sufficiently large. This 
corresponds to the case when VIT padding with sufficiently large σT2 is used. 
 From statistical knowledge, we know sample variance is very sensitive to outliers3. 
In order for empirical estimation of sample entropy to be robust against outliers, we use 
                                                 
3
 An outlier is an observation that lies an abnormal distance from other values in the sample of the padded 
traffic PIAT. 
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the method developed in [32]: First, we create a histogram of the PIAT sample for a 
given bin size (say, ∆h). Then, according to [32], the differential entropy estimator of a 
random variable X’s continuous distribution is given by 
 ∆+≈
i
ii h
n
k
n
k
H loglog~  (3.23) 
 
where n is the sample size, ki is the number of sample points in the ith bin, and ∆h is the 
histogram’s bin size. If a constant bin size is used throughout the experiment, term log∆h 
in (3.23) is a constant and hence does not influence the recognition result. It can, 
therefore, be discarded, and the entropy estimation formula then simplifies to the 
following: 
≈
i
ii
n
k
n
k
H log~  (3.24) 
 
Note that ∆h, the histogram’s bin size, plays an important role in the entropy estimation. 
As the bin size approaches positive infinity, all the estimated entropy approaches zero. In 
Theorem 3.4, we provide formulae of the optimal bin size by minimizing the mean 
square error (MSE) of the entropy estimation.  Please see Section 3.5.4 for the proof. 
Theorem 3.4: The optimal bin size ∆h for the histogram-based entropy estimator can be 
calculated as follows: 
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I
x
σ6
=∆  (3.25) 
where σ is the standard deviation of the underlying distribution and the number of bin I 
can be calculated as follows: 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (3.26) 
 
 This entropy estimator is robust in the sense that it is based on probability weighted 
sum. Generally, the probability that outliers occur is small. Thus, the probability weight 
reduces the noise’s impact on the entropy estimation. Moreover, from the discussion in 
[32] and our experiments, we found that this histogram-based entropy estimator matches 
the value predicted by Theorem 3.3. 
3.4. Evaluations 
In this section, we report results on evaluating system security in terms of detection rate. 
The evaluations will be based on both theoretical analysis (from the previous section) 
and experiments. 
 In our experiments, we let the adversary use a high-performance network analyzer, 
such as Agilent’s J6841A [33], to dump the padded traffic for traffic analysis. A series of 
experiments were carried out. In terms of padded traffic type, we measure both systems 
with CIT and VIT padding. In terms of experimental environments, we consider the 
following cases: a) a laboratory environment, b) a campus network, and c) a wide area 
network. 
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 GWA and GWB in Figure 1 are installed with TimeSys Linux/Real-Time [29]. Both 
CIT and VIT paddings use a timer with interrupt interval mean equal to 10ms. The 
payload has two rate states: 10 packets per second (pps) and 40pps. We assume both 
rates occur in equal probability, that is, P(ωl)=P(ωh)=50%. 
3.4.1. Experiments in a Laboratory Environment 
The advantage of performing the experiments in a laboratory environment is that we can 
control the cross traffic over the network. The disadvantage is that the generated cross 
traffic may not have the same characteristics of those in a real network. Nevertheless, 
our experiment setup is shown in Figure 4. 
 The two gateways are connected by a Marconi ESR-5000 enterprise switch router 
[34]. Subnet C is connected to the router as the cross traffic (noise) generator while the 
cross traffic receiver is located in Subnet D. Note that the cross traffic shares the 
outgoing link of the router, creating a situation where the cross traffic has an impact on 
the padded traffic. We run several cases of experiments as described below. 
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Figure 4. Experiment Setup in Laboratory for Passive Attacks 
 
 
3.4.1.1. The Case of Zero Cross Traffic 
For the case of no cross traffic, the workstation in subnet C does not transmit, and the 
router only deals with the padded traffic from GWA. That is, σnet2 in (3.15) is 0. Hence, 
the variance ratio r becomes 
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This situation is the best case for the adversary as he can observe traffic with minimum 
disturbance. Hence, this is the worst case for the administrator that wants to prevent 
traffic analysis attacks. 
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3.4.1.1.1. CIT Link Padding 
First, we analyze systems that use CIT link padding. That is, σT2 is 0. Hence, (3.27) is 
further simplified as follows: 
2
,
2
,
lgw
hgw
r
σ
σ
=  (3.28) 
From the theorems in Section 3.3.2, we see that the detection rate is a function of sample 
size n and ratio r. 
 Figure 5 (a) shows the distributions of padded traffic’s PIAT under low rate (10pps) 
and high rate (40pps) payload traffic. We have the following observations: 
1. The two distributions are almost bell-shaped. This (partially) validates our 
assumption that the padded traffic’s PIAT has a normal distribution. 
2. The means of padded traffic’s PIAT under different rates of payload traffic are 
virtually identical. This is also consistent with the assumption made in 3.3.2.1. 
3. The two distributions are slightly different. The variance of padded traffic’s 
PIAT conditioned on the high-rate payload traffic, σ2gw,h in (3.14) is slightly 
larger than the variance of padded traffic’s PIAT conditioned on the low-rate 
payload traffic, σ2gw,l in (3.12). This implies 
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(3.29) 
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 Figure 5 (b) shows both empirical and theoretical curves of detection rate for 
different feature statistics. We have the following observations: 
1. The empirical detection rate curves coincide well with their theoretical 
counterparts. This validates our theoretical model. The empirical curve of sample 
variance is a little lower than the theoretical one because sample variance is very 
sensitive to outliers in the data. 
2. The detection rate of sample mean is almost 50%. Sample mean is not an 
effective feature for the adversary. 
3. On the other hand, as the sample size increases, detection rates for both sample 
variance and sample entropy increase as predicted by our Theorem 3.2 and 
Theorem 3.3. At sample size of 1,000, both features achieve the detection rate of 
almost 100%. This means that CIT padding fails if the adversary uses sample 
variance or sample entropy as feature statistic. Generally speaking, sample 
entropy performs empirically better than sample variance in terms of detection 
rate. 
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Figure 5. CIT Padding with Zero Cross Traffic 
 
 
  
34 
3.4.1.1.2. VIT Link Padding 
Recall from (3.27), the variance ratio r in (3.15) is given by 
2
,
2
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,
2
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hgwT
r
σσ
σσ
+
+
=  
 
where σT2 ≥  0 since we are using VIT padding. 
 Theorems in 3.3.2 show that when r approaches 1, the detection rates approach 50% 
for all the three feature statistics. We note that for CIT padding, the value of r decreases 
with increasing values of σT2. Figure 6 (a) displays the empirical curves of detection rate 
in terms of σT for a fixed sample size of 2,000. We can see that when σT increases, the 
detection rate quickly drops and approaches 50%, as expected. Clearly, a system with 
VIT padding performs better (i.e., with lower detection rate) than one with CIT padding. 
 In any case, as shown in (3.17) and (3.21), when the size of sample increases, the 
detection rate increases as well. An interesting question is: How large does a sample 
have to be in order for the adversary to have sufficiently high probability in making a 
correct detection? Let n(p) be the sample size that can achieve a detection rate of p  
percent. Figure 6 (b) provides the theoretical curve of n(99%) vs. σT. We can see that 
with a reasonable value of σT, the sample size needs to be extremely large in order to 
achieve a 99% detection rate. For example, when the timer interval standard deviation σT 
=1ms, to achieve the detection rate of 99%, the sample size has to be greater than 1011. It 
is virtually impossible for an attacker to obtain such a large sample. This clearly shows 
the effectiveness of VIT padding. 
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Figure 6. VIT Padding - Detection Rate vs. Sample Size 
 
 
3.4.1.2. The Case of Non-Zero Cross Traffic 
Recall that the case of zero-cross traffic is the best case for the adversary. As VIT has 
shown to be effective in the case of zero cross traffic, we will no longer have to consider 
systems with VIT padding here since VIT has been shown to be effective even for the 
adversary’s best-case scenario (zero cross traffic with a line tap very near the sender 
gateway). We thus concentrate on the system with CIT padding. In a system with cross 
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traffic, σnet2 in (3.15) may no longer be zero. As for CIT padding, where σT2=0, the 
variance ratio  in (16) now becomes 
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=  (3.30) 
 
We observe that r decreases with increasing σnet2, resulting in a low detection rate for all 
feature statistics. Thus, the bigger σnet2, the smaller the detection rate. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Empirical Detection Rate with Cross Traffic in Laboratory 
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 In the experiments described here, cross traffic generated from within subnet C 
causes router congestion, which in turn affects the observation by the adversary. Figure 7 
shows how the detection rate is impacted by the amount of cross traffic. We can make 
the following observations:  
1. Note that the PIAT for the padded traffic remains at 10ms. Hence, the amount of 
cross traffic is directly proportional to the utilization of the link shared between 
Subnet B and Subnet D. The data shows that as the link utilization increases, the 
detection rate of sample entropy and sample variance decreases. Intuitively, this 
is because the crossover traffic between Subnet C and Subnet D interferes with 
the padded traffic between GWA and GWB, and σ2net increases with the shared 
link’s utilization. The sample mean’s detection rate remains low, as expected. 
2. We observe that sample entropy results in a better detection rate than sample 
variance does. It can be perceived that, with the increase of the shared link’s 
utilization, outliers have more chance of occurring. Sample variance is much 
more sensitive to outliers and, hence, it has a low detection rate. 
3. Even with the link utilization of 40%, sample entropy can still have a detection 
rate of about 70%, implying that CIT padding may still not be as effective in this 
kind of situation. 
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3.4.2. Experiments over Campus and Wide Area Networks 
Figure 8 shows the setup for the experiments discussed in this subsection. Figure 8 (a) is 
a setup for experiments over the Texas A&M Campus Network. That is, the padded 
traffic goes through Texas A&M campus network before it reaches the receiver’s 
gateway. Figure 8 (b) is a setup for experiments over the Internet between Ohio State 
University and Texas A&M University. Here, the sender workstation and the sender 
gateway are located at Ohio State University. The padded traffic goes through the 
Internet and arrives at Texas A&M University, where the receiver gateway and the 
receiver’s workstation are located. In both cases, the observation point of the adversary 
is located directly in front of the receiver gateway and thus maximally far from the 
sender. We note that in this case, the path from the sender’s workstation to the receiver’s 
workstation spans over 15 routers. 
 In each case, we collect data continuously for a complete day (24 hours). The data 
for the case of Texas A&M campus network was collected on March 24, 2003 while the 
data for the wide are network case was collected on March 26, 2003. Figure 9 (a) and 
Figure 9 (b) display the detection rate throughout the observation period when sample 
size is 1000. We make the following observations:  
1. When the padded traffic traverses only the Texas A&M campus network, the 
detection rates of sample entropy and sample variance are high for almost all the 
time we collected data. This means that over a medium-size enterprise network 
like the Texas A&M campus, the crossover traffic has limited influence on the 
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padded traffic’s PIAT. Consequently, we would not recommend CIT padding for 
use in such an environment. 
2. When the padded traffic traverses more network elements, such as the span of the 
Internet between Ohio State University and Texas A&M University, the 
detection rates are low. This is because the padded traffic experiences congestion 
at a large number of routers and switches, and its PIAT is seriously distorted with 
a relatively large σ2net. 
3. In the case of wide area networks, sample entropy and sample variance can 
experience over 65% detection rates during periods of relatively low network 
activity (such as at 2:00AM). This means that CIT padding may still be 
sufficiently safe even if the adversary is very remote. 
Experimental results in Figure 9 match our theoretical analysis in Section 3.3.2. This 
further validates the correctness of our theoretical framework for analyzing the passive 
link load analysis attack and their countermeasures. 
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Figure 8. Experiment Setup over Campus and the Internet for Passive Attacks 
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Figure 9. Empirical Detection Rate for Passive Attacks over Campus and Internet 
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3.5. Theorem Proof 
In this subsection, we prove theorems introduced in Section 3.3.2. 
3.5.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1 
Theorem 3.1: Using sample mean as the classification feature gives rise to an estimated 
detection rate 
( )rrvX +−≈ /12
11  (3.31) 
 
where r  is defined in (3.15). 
Proof: The distribution of sample mean for a normal distribution N(µ, σ2)  is still a 
normal one, N(µ, σ2/n). Thus, sample mean lX  for the case of the payload traffic rate 
being low has a normal distribution 
( ) ( ) 





==
n
NNxf ll
2
2
1 ,,
σµσµ  (3.32) 
Similarly, sample mean hX  for the high payload traffic rate has a normal distribution 
( ) ( ) 





==
n
NNxf hh
2
2
2 ,,
σµσµ  (3.33) 
Since lX  and hX  are normally distributed, we can use the Bhattacharyya bound [27] to 
estimate the error rate as follows: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxfxfPP hlhlX ≤ ωωωωε ||  (3.34) 
 
Substituting (3.32), (3.33), and P(ωl)=P(ωh)=0.5 into (3.34) and carrying out the 
integration, we have 
( )kX −≤ exp2
1
ε  (3.35) 
where 
22
22
2ln
2
1
hl
hl
k
σσ
σσ +
=  
(3.36) 
 
Substituting (3.15) into (3.36) and some rearranging, we have 
( )
2
/1ln
2
1 rrk +=  (3.37) 
Substituting (3.37) into (3.35), the error rate is given by 
( )rrX +≤ /12
1
ε  (3.38) 
 
The detection rate Xv  then satisfies the following: 
v  =  ε−1  (3.39) 
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 ≥  
( )rr +− /12
11  (3.40) 
Thus, we can use the lower bound of (3.40) as the estimation of detection rate by sample 
mean. The theorem is proven. 
In the following, we prove that detection rate r is an increasing function of r when 
the adversary use sample mean as the feature statistic. To prove that Xv  increases with r, 
we need to prove that the term ( ) ( )rrrt += /12   in (3.17) increases with r. 






−=
rr
drdt 11
2
1/  (3.41) 
Since r ≥ 1, dt/dr ≥ 0. Thus t(r) increases with r, and the decision rate Xv  increases with 
r. 
3.5.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2 
Theorem 3.2: Using sample variance as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 






−
−≈ 5.0,
1
1max
n
C
v YY  (3.42) 
 
where C is calculated as follows: 
  
45 
22
1log
1
2
1
log
1
112
1






−
−
+






−
−
=
r
r
r
r
r
CY  (3.43) 
 
and r is defined in (3.15). 
Proof: Denote Xn-12 as a random variable with a chi square distribution ( )xf
n
2
1−χ
  with 
freedom n-1, which is defined as follows, 
( )





 −Γ






−
=
−
−
−
2
12
2
exp
2
1
2
1
2
1 n
x
x
xf
n
n
nχ
 
(3.44) 
 
where x > 0. Denote Y as the random variable of sample variance. Then ( ) 2/1 σYn −  has 
a chi square distribution with freedom n-1 [31]. That is 
Ynn 2
2
1
1
σ
χ −=
−
 
(3.45) 
From (3.45), we get 
2
1
2
1 −−
= n
n
Y χσ  (3.46) 
From chi square’s properties, we have sample variance’s mean Y  as 
2σ=Y  (3.47) 
and its variance var(Y) as 
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( )
1
2
var
4
−
=
n
Y σ  (3.48) 
To get sample variance’s PDF at sample size n, we first compute its distribution function 
( )yYP <
 
=  






<
−
−
y
n
P n
2
1
2
1
χσ  (3.49) 
 =  





 −
<
−
ynP n 2
2
1
1
σ
χ  (3.50) 
Differentiating the two sides of (3.50), we have the density function 
( ) 22 112 1
l
Y
nynfyf
n σσχ
−





 −
=
−
 (3.51) 
We denote Yl as the random variable of sample variance of padded traffic’s PIAT at the 
low rate payload traffic. Substituting (3.44) into (3.51), we then derive Yl’s density 
function ( )yf
lY
 
( ) 2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
2
12
2
1
exp1
l
n
l
n
l
Y
n
n
ynyn
yf
l σ
σσ
−





 −Γ






−
−





−
=
−
−
−
 
(3.52) 
 
 
Similarly, Yh is the random variable of sample variance of padded traffic’s PIAT at high 
rate payload traffic, and its density function ( )yf
hY
 is 
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( ) 2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
2
12
2
1
exp1
h
n
h
n
h
Y
n
n
ynyn
yf
h σ
σσ
−





 −Γ






−
−





−
=
−
−
−
 
(3.53) 
 
To get the detection rate, we calculate the cross point yc of ( )yf lY  and ( )yf hY   
( ) ( )cYcY yfyf hl =  (3.54) 
After lengthy arithmetic operations, we have 
22
22
2
2
log
lh
lh
l
h
cy σσ
σσ
σ
σ
−






=  (3.55) 
Now we use Chebynov inequality for the estimation of error rate if the adversary uses 
sample variance as the feature statistic. The distance from the mean of Yl to the cross 
point yc is denoted as Dl 
lcl YyD −=  (3.56) 
Substituting (3.47) and (3.55) into (3.56), we have 
2
22
2
2
2
1log l
lh
h
l
h
lD σ
σσ
σ
σ
σ








−
−






=  (3.57) 
 
Denoting cl as the ratio of Dl to the standard deviation of Yl 
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( )l
l
l Y
D
c
var
=  (3.58) 
 
Substituting (3.48) and (3.57) into (3.58), we have 
1
2
1log 22
2
2
2
−
−
−






=
n
c
lh
h
l
h
l
σσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(3.59) 
 
Similarly, denoting Dh as the distance from the mean of Yh to the cross point yc, 








−






−=−= 22
2
2
2
22 log1
ll
l
l
h
hchh yD
σσ
σ
σ
σ
σσ  (3.60) 
Then ch, the ratio of Dh and the standard deviation of Yh, can be calculated as follows 
1
2
log1 22
2
2
2
−
−






−
=
n
c
lh
l
l
h
h
σσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(3.61) 
 
When sample size n is big (>40), we can assume that a chi square PDF is symmetrical. 
Thus from Chebynov inequality, we can get the error rate eY 
2
2
1
2
1
22
hl
Y
cc
e
+
≤  
(3.62) 
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Thus, the detection rate vY can be calculated as 
Yv  =  Ye−1  (3.63) 
 ≥  
22 4
1
4
11
hl cc
−−  (3.64) 
Substituting (3.15), (3.59) and (3.61) into (3.64), we have 
1
1
−
−≥
n
C
v YY  (3.65) 
where 
22
1log
1
2
1
log
1
112
1






−
−
+






−
−
=
r
r
r
r
r
CY  (3.66) 
 
Thus, we use the lower bound of vY as the estimation of the detection rate. Since that vY 
must be greater than 50%, we can get (3.19). The theorem is proved. 
In the following, we prove that vY  is an increasing function of r. That is, we need to 
prove that CY  in (3.20) is a decreasing function of r. For terms in (3.20), we have the 
following denotations 
( )
1
log
1
−
=
r
r
rCY  (3.67) 
( )
12 −
=
r
r
rCY  (3.68) 
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If CY1 is decreasing function and CY2 is an increasing function, then CY is a decreasing 
function. 
 We first prove that CY1  is a decreasing function. Let r=ex, we have 
( ) ( )
111 −
==
xyY e
x
xcrC  (3.69) 
dr
dCY1
 
=  
dr
dc y1
 
(3.70) 
 =  
dr
dx
dx
dc y1
 
(3.71) 
 =  
( )21
1
−
−−
x
xx
er
xee
 (3.72) 
Since r>1, x>0, the denominator of (3.72) is greater than 0. We have the Taylor 
expansion of the numerator of (3.72) as follows 
( )
∞
=






−
−=−−
1 !1
1
!
11
n
nxx x
nn
xee  (3.73) 
Since  
( ) 0!1
1
!
1
<
−
−
nn
 (3.74) 
So 
01 <−− xx xee  (3.75) 
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Thus 
011 <=
dr
dc
dr
dC yY
 
(3.76) 
 
CY1 is a decreasing function in terms of r. 
 Now we prove CY2 is an increasing function of r. Let r = ex, we have, 
( ) ( )
11
log
22
−
==
−
=
x
x
yY
e
xe
xc
r
rr
rC  (3.77) 
 
and 
( )2
2
22
1−
−−
==
x
xxx
yY
er
xeee
dr
dc
dr
dC
 (3.78) 
 
Since r>1, x>0, the denominator of (3.78) is greater than 0. The Taylor expansion of the 
numerator of (3.78) is as follows 

∞
=





 −−
=−−
1
2
!
12
n
n
n
xxx x
n
n
xeee  (3.79) 
Since  
0
!
12
,0 ≥−−>∀
n
n
n
n
 
(3.80) 
we have 
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02 ≥−− xxx xeee  (3.81) 
So 
022 >=
dr
dc
dr
dC yY
 
(3.82) 
 
 
and CY2(r) is an increasing function of r. 
 Thus, we have proved that __ is an increasing function in terms of r. 
3.5.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3 
Theorem 3.3: Using sample entropy as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 






−≈ 5.0,1max~
n
C
v HH  (3.83) 
where CH  is calculated as follows: 
22~
log
1log2
1
log
1
log2
1













 −
+












−
=
r
r
r
r
r
CH  (3.84) 
 
and r is defined in (3.15).  
Proof: A normal distribution’s differential entropy can be calculated as 
_  
_    
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2
12log 2 +
=
piσH  (3.85) 
Here we use sample variance Y defined in (3.18) to estimate sample entropy H~  
2
12log~ +
=
YH pi  (3.86) 
To get sample entropy’s PDF, we first derive its distribution, 
( ) 





<=





<
+
=<
−
pi
pi
22
12log~ 12heYPhYPhHP  (3.87) 
Differentiating two sides of (3.87), we get sample entropy’s PDF 
( )
'121212
~
222 












<=





=
−−−
pipipi
hhh
YH
eeYPefhf  (3.88) 
Denote Hl as the sample entropy of padded traffic’s PIAT at the low-rate payload traffic, 
and ( )hf
lH
~  as Hl’s PDF. Denote Hh as the sample entropy of padded traffic’s PIAT at 
the high-rate payload traffic, and ( )hf
hH
~  as Hh’s PDF. To get the detection rate, we need 
to calculate the cross point hc of ( )hf
lH
~  and ( )hf
hH
~  
( ) ( )'~~ cHcH hfhf hl =  (3.89) 
 
By lengthy arithmetic operations 
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2
1log2log 22
22
2
2
+
	
	







−






=
lh
lh
l
h
ch
σσ
σσ
σ
σ
pi
 
(3.90) 
For the ease of estimation, we approximate sample entropy’s mean as follows 
( )
2
12log~ 2 +
=
piσHE  (3.91) 
That is, we approximate the entropy estimator in (3.86) as an unbiased one. 
 Now we use Chebynov inequality for the error rate estimation. The distance from the 
mean of Hl to the cross point hc is denoted as Dl 
lD  =  
2
12log
2
log2log
222
22
2
2
+
−
	
	







−






llh
lh
l
h
piσσσ
σσ
σ
σ
pi
 
(3.92) 
 =  
2
loglog 22
2
2
2
	
	







−






lh
h
l
h
σσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(3.93) 
 
Using Taylor expansion over (3.86) and by appropriate approximation, we get  
( )
n
H
2
1~
var ≈  (3.94) 
(3.94) is the same result as for the histogram-based entropy estimator in [32]. Denoting 
cl as the ratio of Dl to the standard deviation of hl 
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n
c
lh
h
l
h
l
2
12
loglog 22
2
2
2
	
	







−






=
σσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(3.95) 
Similarly, denoting Dh as the distance from the mean of Hh to the cross point hc and ch as 
the ratio of Dh to the standard deviation of hh, we have 
lD  =  
2
1log2log
2
12log 22
22
2
2
2
+
	
	







−






−
+ lh
lh
l
h
h
σσ
σσ
σ
σ
pi
piσ
 
(3.96) 
 =  
2
log
log
2
2
2
22
	
	
	
	
	
















−
l
h
l
lh
σ
σ
σ
σσ
 
(3.97) 
n
c
l
h
l
lh
h
2
12
log
log
2
2
2
22
	
	
	
	
	
















−
=
σ
σ
σ
σσ
 
(3.98) 
 
So error rate is calculated as 
n
C
cc
e H
hl
H
~
22~ 4
1
4
1
=+≤  (3.99) 
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where 
2
2
2
2
22
2
22
2
2
2
~
log
log2
1
loglog2
1
	
	
	
	
	






























−
+
	
	















−






=
l
h
l
lhlh
h
l
h
HC
σ
σ
σ
σσσσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(3.100) 
Substitute (3.15) into (3.100), we have 
( )
22~
log
1log2
1
log
1
log2
1
	











 −
+
	












−
=
r
r
r
r
r
CH  (3.101) 
Since 
HH ev ~~ 1−≥  (3.102) 
Substituting (3.102) into (3.99), we have 
n
C
v HH
~
~ 1−≥  (3.103) 
 
 In this section, we use the lower bound of Hv ~  as the estimation of the detection rate 
by sample entropy. Consider that detection rate must be greater than 50% and we can get 
(3.21) in Theorem 3.3. The theorem is proved. 
In the following we prove that Hv ~  is an increasing function in terms of r. That is, we 
need to prove that HC ~  is a decreasing function of r. Denote 
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( )
r
r
rCH log
1
1
−
=  (3.104) 
( )
12 −
=
r
r
rCH  (3.105) 
 
If CH1(r) in (3.104) and CH2(r) in (3.105) are increasing functions of r, HC ~  is a 
decreasing function of r. 
 We can see that CH1(r)=1/ CY1(r), where CY1(r) is defined in (3.67). Since CY1(r) is a 
decreasing function of r, CH1(r) is an increasing function r. CH2(r)=CY2(r),  where CY2(r) 
is defined in (3.68). We have proved that CY2(r) is an increasing function, so is CH2(r).  
 Thus Hv ~  is of r, where r>1. 
3.5.4. Proof of Theorem 3.4 
Theorem 3.4: The optimal bin size ∆h for the histogram-based entropy estimator can be 
calculated as follows: 
I
x
σ6
=∆  (3.106) 
where σ is the standard deviation of the underlying distribution and the number of bin I 
can be calculated as follows: 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (3.107) 
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Proof: We now develop theory calculating the optimal bin size for histogram based 
entropy estimation. In [32], for a histogram based entropy estimation, 
( ) 2
24
1
2
1~





 ∆
+
−
−≈
σ
x
n
IHHE  (3.108) 
where H~  is the estimated entropy, H  is original entropy of random variable X, I is the 
number of bins, n is the sample size, ∆x is the bin size and σ is X’s standard deviation. 
 If random variable X is normally distributed, 
( ) 1
2
1~
var −≈ nH  (3.109) 
Moreover, for a normally distributed random variable, since the probability of x>3σ  is 
very small and ignorable, we have the following relationship between bin size ∆x, the 
number of bins I and random variable X’s standard deviation σ, 
xI∆=σ6  (3.110) 
Thus  
6
Ix
=
∆
σ
 
(3.111) 
We can calculate the mean square error (MSE) of the entropy estimation as follows, 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]22 ~~~ HBIASHVARHHE +=−  (3.112) 
where  
( )[ ] ( ) HHEHBIAS −= ~~  (3.113) 
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Substitute (3.108) and (3.109) into (3.112), 
( )[ ] 2212 1
24
1
2
1~








−
−




 ∆
+=− −
n
Ix
nHHE
σ
 
(3.114) 
To derive a minimum mean square error, the second term in (3.114) should be 
minimized, 
n
Ix 1
24
1 2 −
=




 ∆
σ
 
(3.115) 
 
Substituting (3.111) into (3.115), we have 
n
I
I 2
16
24
1 2 −
=





 
(3.116) 
Thus 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (3.117) 
I
x
σ6
=∆  (3.118) 
 
3.6. Summary 
While researchers have proposed link padding as an effective way to prevent traffic 
analysis, there was no systematic method to analyze the security of a system under the 
traffic analysis attacks before our study results were released. We provide an effective 
analysis model for the evaluation of different padding strategies aimed at camouflaging 
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the payload traffic rates under traffic analysis attacks. We define as our security metric 
detection rate, which is the probability that the rate of payload traffic is recognized. We 
believe that our analysis methods can be widely used to analyze other security systems 
for different objectives under traffic analysis attacks.  
 By statistical analysis of different feature statistics (sample mean, sample variance, 
and sample entropy) of the padded traffic PIATs, we found that sample variance and 
sample entropy can exploit the correlation between payload traffic rate and PIATs of 
padded traffic, when the padded traffic is dumped and explored next to the sender 
gateway or at a remote site across one or more congested routers. The reason for the 
failure of CIT padding is that payload traffic causes small disturbances to the timer’s 
interval, which is used to control packet sending. Moreover, the higher the user traffic 
rate, the larger the disturbance of the PIAT of the padded traffic. 
 After a careful analysis, we propose VIT link padding as an alternative to the most 
common CIT link padding. Both theoretical analysis and empirical results validate the 
effectiveness of VIT padding strategy. The importance of the VIT padding technique is 
validated by extensive experiments showing that CIT link padding may be compromised 
even at a remote site behind noisy routers.  
 In this portion of the dissertation research, we discuss the simple case where two 
classes of traffic rates should be distinguished. Our technique can be easily extended to 
multiple traffic rates by performing more offline training. It is also straight-forward to 
use our technique to track the user payload traffic rate variation by measuring sample 
entropy of the PIAT of the corresponding padded traffic. 
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4. ACTIVE LINK-LOAD ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section, we address issues related to the active link-load analysis attack and their 
countermeasures. In particular, we study how an adversary may discover link load by 
actively pinging victim networks and analyzing statistics of ping round trip times, (i.e., 
the active link load analysis attack) even if link load is protected by the VIT padding 
analyzed in Section 3. We will also develop and evaluate countermeasures against this 
kind of attack. 
4.1. Models 
This section first presents the network model and then discusses link padding 
mechanisms used as countermeasures for traffic analysis attacks. Finally, we define the 
model of adversary who uses statistical pattern recognition strategies for active ping 
probing attacks on these security systems, which employ link padding mechanisms. 
4.1.1. Network Model 
We use a similar network model as shown in Figure 1. But we assume that the payload 
traffic has been protected by VIT link padding implemented on gateways GWA and GWB, 
which allow cross traffic to pass through.  
4.1.2. Adversary Model 
We first present our assumptions on the capabilities of the adversary, i.e. threat model. 
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1. The adversary cannot obtain information from packet contents, which are 
perfectly encrypted. All (payload or dummy) packets have a constant size and 
dummy packets cannot be distinguished from payload packets.  
2. The adversary is external, that is, she is not a participant of either Subnet A or B 
and does not compromise sender and receiver gateways. The adversary can only 
obtain access to the two subnets in seemingly legal ways, such as pinging the two 
gateways.   
3. The adversary has complete knowledge about the gateway machines and the 
countermeasure algorithms used for preventing traffic analysis. Thus, the 
adversary can simulate the entire system, including the gateway machines, to 
obtain a priori knowledge about traffic behavior. In many studies on information 
security, it is a convention that we make worst case assumptions like this. But, 
we will show in this section, even without the capability of simulating the system, 
the adversary can also track the traffic rate changing pattern by a method 
introduced in this section.  
 Now we discuss the adversary strategy in terms of an active link load analysis attack. 
Recall that the motivation of link padding is to ensure traffic confidentiality, i.e., to 
prevent the adversary from performing traffic analysis and inferring critical 
characteristics of the payload traffic exchanged over unprotected networks. We limit the 
adversary’s interest to payload traffic rate, that is, the rate at which payload traffic is 
exchanged between protected subnets. Specifically, we assume that there is a set of 
discrete payload traffic rates {ω1, …, ωm}. At a given time, the rate of payload traffic 
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from the sender will be one of those rates. Consequently, the objective of the adversary 
is to identify at which of the m rates the payload is transmitted. But, we will also 
demonstrate how the adversary may take the approach outlined in this section to track 
the continuous changing pattern of the payload traffic.  
 We consider that, based on these assumptions, the adversary may deploy a 
sophisticated ping probing attack aimed at determining the payload traffic rate. In the 
attack, the adversary pings the sender gateway GWA, analyzes the statistics of round trip 
times (RTT) of these ping packets and tries to derive Subnet A’s payload traffic rate 
(even if GWA uses VIT padding). We use this ping attack as a model to analyze a much 
larger class of active probing attacks. 
 The adversary can analyze his sample of ping RTT data based on Bayes decision 
theory [27]. The entire attack strategy consists of two phases: Offline training phase and 
online recognition phase. We will describe them below. 
The offline training phase can be decomposed into the following steps: 
1. Collecting training data: The adversary reconstructs the entire link padding 
system and collects timing information of ping packets at different payload 
traffic rates.  
2. Preprocessing training data: From the timing data, the adversary derives RTT 
information at different payload traffic rates.  
3. Selecting feature from preprocessed training data: The adversary selects a 
statistic of the RTT sample of size n. This statistic is called a feature and will be 
used for traffic rate classification. Possible features we study in this section are 
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sample mean, sample variance, and sample entropy. The adversary then derives 
the Probability Density Functions (PDF) of the selected statistical feature. As 
histograms are usually too coarse for the distribution estimation, we assume that 
the adversary uses the Gaussian kernel estimator of PDF [1], which is effective 
in our problem domain. 
4. Selecting decision rule: Based on the PDFs of statistical features for different 
payload traffic rates, Bayes decision rules are derived. Recall that there are m 
possible payload traffic rates. The Bayes decision rule can be stated as follows: 
The sample represented by feature s  corresponds to payload rateωi  if 
[ ] ( ) ( )sPsPmj ji ωω ≥∈∀ ,,1  (4.1) 
That is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jjii PsfPsf ωωωω ≥  (4.2) 
where f(s|ωi) is PDF of feature s conditioned on payload traffic rateωi,  P(ωi) is the a 
priori probability that the payload traffic is transmitted at rateωi, and P(ωi|s) is the post 
priori probability that the payload traffic is sent at rateωi  when the collected sample has 
the measured feature equal to s. 
Once the adversary completes her training phase, she can perform the classification 
at run time. We assume that the adversary has the means to ping the gateways GWA and 
GWB. In particular, when she intends to determine the current payload rate, the adversary 
collects a sample of ping RTTs. She calculates the value of the statistical feature from 
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the collected sample and then uses the Bayes decision rules derived in the offline 
training phase to determine the payload traffic rate. 
4.2. Overview of Countermeasures to Link-Load Analysis Attacks 
In Section 3.2, we have introduced CIT padding and VIT padding methods to protect the 
link load from passive link load analysis attacks. Recall the implementation of these 
methods. In CIT Padding, a periodic timer is used on GWA to control the sending of 
padded traffic. In VIT padding, a non-periodic timer is used to GWA to control the 
sending of padded traffic. 
 As we have shown in Section 3.4, VIT padding can effectively counter passive link-
load analysis attacks while the commonly used CIT padding fails under passive link-load 
analysis attacks. 
 In this section of the dissertation, we will show that the active link load analysis 
attack can defeat VIT padding. To counter this kind of active attack, we have to perturb 
both the payload traffic and cross traffic through GWA.  
4.3. Performance Metric and Analysis 
4.3.1. Detection Rate as Performance Metric 
Given models described in the previous section, we would like to evaluate the security of 
the system in Figure 1 in terms of detection rate. Recall that detection rate is defined as 
the probability that the adversary can correctly identify the payload traffic rate. In this 
section, we derive the closed-form formulae for detection rates when the adversary uses 
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sample mean, sample variance, or sample entropy, as the statistical feature, respectively. 
Our formulae will be approximate due to the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless, 
they do correctly reflect the impact of various system parameters, including the type of 
padded traffic, sample size, and statistical feature used. These relationships are useful for 
understanding the nature of the attack and designing effective countermeasures. In the 
next section, we will see that experimental data well matches the detection rate predicted 
by our approximation formulae. 
 Let {X1, …, Xn} be a sample of ping RTT with sample size n. Sample mean X , 
sample variance Y, and sample entropy H~  are defined below: 
Sample Mean: 
n
X
X
n
i
i
=
=
1
 
(4.3) 
Sample Variance: ( )
1
1
2
−
−
=

=
n
mX
Y
n
i
i
 
(4.4) 
Sample Entropy: 
 ∆+≈
i
ii x
n
k
n
k
H loglog~  (4.5) 
Note that in (4.5) we use the histogram-based entropy estimation developed in [32], 
where ki is the number of sample points in the ith bin, and ∆x is the bin size of the 
histogram. In Theorem 4.1, we derive a method to calculate the optimal bin size for the 
estimation of entropy. Refer to Section 4.5.1 for the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
Theorem 4.1: The optimal bin size ∆h for the histogram-based entropy estimator can be 
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I
x
σ6
=∆  (4.6) 
where σ is the standard deviation of the underlying distribution and the number of bin I 
can be calculated as follows: 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (4.7) 
 
Below, we derive close-form formulae for simple cases in which the user payload 
traffic has two statuses: low rate ωl and high rate ωh. 
__ 
4.3.2. Derivation of Detection Rate 
We consider two kinds of systems: stable systems where the payload traffic rate remains 
stable and periodic systems where the payload traffic rate changes periodically. 
4.3.2.1. Detection Rate for Stable Systems 
 The ping RTT can be represented as a random variable. Let RTTlow and RTThigh be 
random variables of RTT when the user payload traffic rate is low and high respectively. 
Denote their means as µl and µh and variances as δl2 and δh2 respectively. Also we define 
r as the ratio between δl2 and δh2. 
2
2
l
hr δ
δ
=  (4.8) 
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 The following theorems provide closed-form formulae for estimation of detection 
rate when sample mean, sample variance, and sample entropy are used as feature 
statistics respectively.  
Theorem 4.2: Using sample mean as the classification feature gives rise to an estimated 
detection rate 
( )
( )rrv
n
lh
lh
x
+















+
−
−−≈
/12
1
4
1
exp1 22
2
σσ
µµ
 
(4.9) 
Theorem 4.3: Using sample variance as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 






−
−≈ 5.0,
1
1max
n
C
v YY  (4.10) 
 
where CY is calculated as follows: 
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Theorem 4.4: Using sample variance as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 






−≈ 5.0,1max~
n
C
v HH  (4.12) 
where CH  is calculated as follows: 
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 Refer to Section 4.5.2 for the proof of Theorem 4.2, Section 4.5.3 for the proof of 
Theorem 4.3 and Section 4.5.4 for the proof of Theorem 4.4, respectively.  
 We have a number of observations from the above theorems: 
1. For sample mean, detection rate increases exponentially with sample size n. Thus, 
if there is a small difference between µh and µl, detection rate will increase 
dramatically with sample size. Furthermore, detection rate decreases when 
variance δl2 and δh2 increase. 
2. For sample variance, the detection rate is an increasing function in terms of 
sample size n. When n → ∞, the detection rate is 100%. This means that if the 
payload traffic lasts for a sufficient time at one rate, then the adversary can obtain 
a sample of sufficiently large size, and he may detect the payload traffic rate by 
sample variance of ping RTT. Furthermore, the detection rate is an increasing 
function of r defined in (4.8), where r ≥ 1. That is, the smaller r, the closer the 
two variances under different payload traffic rates and, intuitively, the lower the 
corresponding detection rate. When r = 1, the detection rate is 50%. That is, the 
probing attack using sample variance will fail. 
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3. For sample entropy, the detection rate is also an increasing function in terms of 
sample size n. Also, the detection rate is also an increasing function of r in (4.8), 
where r ≥ 1. When r = 1, the detection rate reaches 50%. 
4.3.2.2. Detection Rate for Periodic Systems 
In this kind of system, the payload traffic rate changes periodically with time. Thus, a 
sample of ping RTTs may span payload traffic of different rates. A sample of ping RTTs 
can be partitioned into a few segments. Each segment corresponds to an interval during 
which the payload traffic rate is either low or high. Assume that a sample has L possible 
partitions: {Partitioni: 1  ≤  i  ≤ L} in terms of segment length. For example, if we have a 
sample of one ping RTT, we have two possible partitions: Partition1 = {the one ping 
RTT is collected when the payload traffic rate is low} and Partition2 = {the one ping 
RTT is collected when the payload traffic rate is high}. 
 We denote a correct detection of the payload rate by an adversary as the one in 
which the adversary discovers the payload traffic rate while he collects the first RTT of 
the sample. It can be seen that the first RTT may be collected when the user payload 
traffic rate is either low or high. 
 To derive the detection rate for this kind of system, we can derive the occurrence 
probability Pr(Partitioni) of Partitioni and the average recognition error rate conditioned 
on this partition case, Pr(error|Partitioni). Then we have the general form of detection 
rate formula vd for this kind of system as follows: 
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( ) ( )−= iid PartitionPartitionerrorv Pr|Pr1  (4.14) 
 For the case of two payload traffic rates, we assume that the payload traffic at each 
rate lasts for half of the payload rate changing period, M  is the number of ping RTTs in 
half of this period4 and n is the sample size, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.5: When sample size n < M, a closed form of detection rate is as follows: 





 −
+
+−
−=
M
n
M
nM
vd 2
111 ε  (4.15) 
where error rate ε  = 1-v, and v can be calculated in (4.9), (4.10) or (4.12) when the 
adversary uses different features respectively. 
 Refer to Section 4.5.5 for the proof. From Theorem 4.5, we have the following 
observations: 
1. When the ping packet rate is fixed, the payload rate changing period is larger, M 
is larger and thus vd is larger. This is intuitive.  
2. vd has a complicated relationship with sample size n because of ε’s relation with 
n. From our experiments and later analysis, we can see that given M, detection 
rate vd has a maximum value at some n. 
4.4. Evaluations 
In this section, we evaluate the security of a system under an active traffic analysis 
attack. We will also demonstrate how well the theoretical analysis of detection rate from 
the previous section approximates results from experiments designed to reflect real-life 
                                                 
4
 Ping packets are sent out at a constant rate. 
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situations. In the series of experiments that we conducted, we assume that the adversary 
uses a high-performance network analyzer, such as Agilent’s J6841A, to dump ping 
packets. In terms of experimental environments, we consider the following three cases: 
laboratory (i.e., local area network - LAN), campus networks (i.e., metropolitan area 
network - MAN), and Internet, (i.e., wide area network - WAN). 
 GWA and GWB in Figure 10 run TimeSys Linux/Real-Time. To counter passive 
traffic analysis attacks, VIT padding is used. The timer interval satisfies a normal 
distribution N(10ms, 3ms2), which is a reasonable setting for resisting passive traffic 
analysis attacks. Thus, the average rate of padded traffic between the two security 
gateways is 100 packets per second (pps). The payload has two average rate states: 10 
pps and 40pps. We assume both rates occur in equal probability. Note that for such a 
system, the detection rate for the adversary is lower-bounded at 50%. For all the 
experiments, the adversary uses an appropriate rate of ping packets with size of 512 
bytes. 
4.4.1. Experiments in a Laboratory Environment 
The experiment setup is shown in Figure 10. The advantage of experimenting in a 
laboratory environment is that we can control the cross traffic over the network. The 
disadvantage is that the generated cross traffic may not reflect the characteristics of a 
real network. 
 The two gateways are connected by a Marconi ESR-5000 enterprise switch router. 
Subnet C is connected to the router as the cross traffic (noise) generator while the cross 
traffic receiver is located in Subnet D. The cross traffic shares the outgoing link of the 
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router, creating a case where the cross traffic has an influence on the padded traffic. The 
adversary pings the sender gateway behind the Marconi router. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Experiment Setup in Laboratory for Active Attacks 
 
4.4.1.1. Results of Stable Systems 
Figure 11 (a) and Figure 11 (b) show the detection rate by different features for cases of 
with and without cross traffic. We have the following observations: 
1. As the sample size increases, as shown in Figure 11 (a), detection rates for 
sample mean, sample variance, and sample entropy increase and approach 100%. 
This shows that when payload traffic lasts for a sufficiently long time at a given 
rate, an adversary can use these three features to determine the payload traffic 
rate with 100% accuracy, even if VIT padding has been used. This means that 
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security systems using padding fail under active traffic analysis attacks. 
Furthermore, the trend of theoretical detection rate curves coincides well with the 
trend of empirical curves for the three features. 
2. From Figure 11 (a) and Figure 11 (b), sample entropy is a fairly robust feature in 
detecting the payload traffic rate. This is because sample entropy defined in (5) is 
not sensitive to outliers, which influence the performance of sample mean and 
sample variance, especially when there is cross traffic. 
3. In Figure 11 (b), as the link utilization increases, the detection rates of the three 
features decrease. This is because the cross traffic between Subnet C and Subnet 
D interferes with ping traffic. In theory, compared to the ping RTT variances σl2 
and σh2 in the no cross traffic case, both these variances are increased in the cross 
traffic case, by a quantity relative to the cross traffic. This will cause a decrease 
in r. As Theorem 4.2 predicts, the detection rate by all three features drops. 
 We have seen that systems with VIT padding fail under active traffic analysis attacks. 
The reason of this failure lies in the subtle interaction between the traffic padding system 
and the probing traffic. While GWA’s network subsystem processes payload packets 
from Subnet A, the processing of ping packets is delayed. A higher rate of payload 
traffic causes more delay on ping packets. This means that sample mean, sample 
variance, and sample entropy of the RTT of the probing packets at a given sample size n 
are changed, and there is some correlation between the user payload traffic rate and 
sample mean, sample variance, and sample entropy of the RTT of the probing packets. 
The adversary can exploit this correlation to discover the user payload traffic rate.  
  
75 
 
 
Figure 11. Detection Rate for Stable Payload Traffic 
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4.4.1.2. Results of Periodical Systems 
Figure 12 (a), (b) and (c) give detection rates for periodical systems. The traffic rate 
changes periodically between 10pps and 40pps. The period in our experiments is 1 
minute. Figure 13 illustrates how the adversary can track continuously changing payload 
traffic rate by probing attacks. We have the following observations. 
1. In all figures, the theoretical curves match the empirical curves generally well. 
This validates various approximate assumptions made when we derive Theorem 
4.5. 
2. As Theorem 4.5 predicts, there exists a maximum detection rate as sample size 
changes. That is, in practice, when the ping probing attack is deployed, the 
adversary has to choose an appropriate sample size to maximize its detection rate. 
3. In Figure 13, sample entropy (sample size = 2,000) is used to track the changing 
pattern of the user payload traffic rate while the payload traffic rate has three 
statuses: 0 pps, 10 pps, and 40 pps. Each rate lasts for 5 minutes in one period. It 
is clear that the adversary can use sample entropy to reconstruct the payload 
traffic rate pattern very well. This further confirms the effectiveness of probing 
attacks. 
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Figure 12. Detection Rate for Periodical Systems 
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Figure 12. Continued 
 
Figure 13. Tracking of the Changing Pattern of the User Payload Traffic Rate 
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4.4.1.3. Security Improvement 
From Theorem 4.2, Theorem 4.3, and Theorem 4.4, we know that when r decreases, 
and/or σl2 and σh2 increase, the detection rate decreases. To reduce r and increase σl2 and 
σh
2
, we may intentionally introduce a random delay to ping packets. This is similar to the 
effect of adding noise to the RTT of ping packets by cross traffic. We assume that the 
random delay satisfies a normal distribution N(µT, σT2). It can be perceived that an 
appropriate selection of µT and σT  will dramatically reduce the detection rate. To 
validate this approach, we again use the configuration in Figure 10 as the experimental 
network setup. There is no cross traffic. Figure 14 gives the detection rate by different 
statistics when ping packets are delayed by a random interval, which satisfies a normal 
distribution N(10ms, 3ms2). We observe that the detection rate achievable by the 
adversary at different feature statistics approaches 50% (the minimum detection rate for 
two class recognition) at a large sample size. 
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Figure 14. Detection Rate by RTT of Delayed Ping Packets with Zero Cross Traffic 
 
 
 In addition to this random delay method, other means may also be used to counter 
the active traffic analysis attacks. To defeat the ping-based probing attack, one can 
disable the ping service on security gateways, but the disadvantage of this method is that 
ping often is a useful service for debugging a network, e.g., to check if GWA is alive. 
Sometimes, one cannot sacrifice functionality for the sake of security. 
 Another method for countering active ping probing attacks is that one should avoid 
sending payload traffic at a constant rate for long periods of time. For example, in a 
peer-to-peer anonymous file sharing system, the file should be split into small pieces 
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before uploading and downloading. Consequently, the detection rate will decrease since 
the adversary cannot get a sufficiently large sample for a constant rate of payload traffic. 
4.4.2. Experiments over Campus and Wide Area Networks 
In this subsection, we examine the detection rate when the ping traffic of the adversary 
traverses a campus network and the internet, respectively. 
 Figure 15 shows the setup for the experiments discussed in this subsection. In both 
cases, the observation point of the adversary is located right in front of the receiver 
gateway and thus maximally far from the sender. Figure 15 (a) is a setup for experiments 
over our local campus network. That is, the ping traffic goes through our local campus 
network before it reaches the sender’s gateway. Figure 15 (b) is a setup for experiments 
over the Internet between a remote campus network and our local campus network. Here, 
the sender workstation and the sender gateway are located at the remote campus network. 
The ping traffic goes through the Internet and arrives at the remote campus network. We 
note that in this case, the path from the sender’s workstation to the receiver’s 
workstation spans 15 or more routers. 
 In each case, we collect data continuously for 24 hours. The data for the case of our 
local campus network was collected on July 16, 2003, while the data for the wide area 
network case was collected on July 14, 2003. 
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Figure 15. Experiment Setup over Campus and Internet for Active Attacks 
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 Figure 16 (a) and (b) show the detection rate throughout the observation period. We 
have the following observations: 
1. When ping traffic traverses only our local campus network, the detection rates of 
sample entropy and sample mean can approach about 75%. This means that over 
a medium-sized enterprise network like our campus network, the cross traffic 
does have an influence on the ping traffic, but systems using VIT padding 
scheme alone still cannot resist ping probing attacks effectively. 
2. When the padded traffic traverses more network elements, such as the Internet 
between the remote campus network and our local campus network, the detection 
rates are much lower. This is because ping traffic has a low scheduling priority at 
a large number of routers and switches, and the RTT of ping packets is seriously 
distorted. 
Experimental results in Figure 16 match our theoretical analysis in Section 4.3.2. 
This further validates the correctness of our theoretical framework for analyzing the 
active link load analysis attack and their countermeasures. 
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Figure 16. Empirical Detection Rate for Active Attacks over Campus and Internet 
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4.5. Theorem Proof 
In this section, we prove theorems introduced in Section 4.3.2. 
4.5.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1 
Theorem 4.1: The optimal bin size ∆h for the histogram-based entropy estimator can be 
calculated as follows: 
I
x
σ6
=∆  (4.16) 
where σ is the standard deviation of the underlying distribution and the number of bin I 
can be calculated as follows: 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (4.17) 
 
Proof: We now develop theory calculating the optimal bin size for histogram based 
entropy estimation. In [32], for a histogram based entropy estimation, 
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IHHE  (4.18) 
where H~  is the estimated entropy, H  is original entropy of random variable X, I is the 
number of bins, n is the sample size, ∆x is the bin size and σ is X’s standard deviation. 
 If random variable X is normally distributed, 
( ) 1
2
1~
var −≈ nH  (4.19) 
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Moreover, for a normally distributed random variable, since the probability of x>3σ  is 
very small and ignorable, we have the following relationship between bin size ∆x, the 
number of bins I and random variable X’s standard deviation σ, 
xI∆=σ6  (4.20) 
Thus  
6
Ix
=
∆
σ
 
(4.21) 
We can calculate the mean square error (MSE) of the entropy estimation as follows, 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]22 ~~~ HBIASHVARHHE +=−  (4.22) 
where  
( )[ ] ( ) HHEHBIAS −= ~~  (4.23) 
Substitute (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.22), 
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To derive a minimum mean square error, the second term in (4.24) should be minimized, 
n
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Substituting (4.21) into (4.25), we have 
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Thus 
( ) nII 31 2 =−  (4.27) 
I
x
σ6
=∆  (4.28) 
 
Below, we derive close-form formulae for simple cases in which the user payload 
traffic has two statuses: low rate ωl and high rate ωh. 
__ 
 
4.5.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2 
Theorem 4.2: Using sample mean as the classification feature gives rise to an estimated 
detection rate 
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(4.29) 
 
Proof: The distribution of sample mean of a normal distribution N(µ, σ2)  is still a normal 
one, N(µ, σ2/n). Thus, sample mean lX  for the case when the payload traffic rate is low 
has a normal distribution 
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Similarly, sample mean hX  for the high payload traffic rate has a normal distribution 
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Since lX  and hX  are normally distributed, we can use the Bhattacharyya bound [27] to 
estimate the error rate as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxfxfPP hlhlX ≤ ωωωωε ||  (4.32) 
 
Substituting (4.30), (4.31), and P(ωl)=P(ωh)=0.5 into (4.32) and carrying out the 
integration, we have 
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After substituting (4.34) into (4.33) and some rearranging, we have 
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Substituting (4.35) into (4.33), the error rate is given by 
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The detection rate Xv  then satisfies the following: 
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 Thus, we can use the lower bound of (4.38) as the estimation of detection rate by 
sample mean. The theorem is proven. 
4.5.3. Proof of Theorem 4.3 
Theorem 4.3: Using sample variance as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 
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where C is calculated as follows: 
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and r is defined in (4.8). 
Proof: Denote Xn-12 as a random variable with a chi square distribution ( )xf
n
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where x > 0. Denote Y as the random variable of sample variance. Then ( ) 2/1 σYn −  has 
a chi square distribution with freedom n-1 [29]. That is 
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From (4.42), we get 
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From chi square’s properties, we have sample variance’s mean Y  as 
2σ=Y  (4.44) 
and its variance var(Y) as 
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To get sample variance’s PDF at sample size n, we first compute its distribution function 
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Differentiating the two sides of (4.47), we have the density function 
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We denote Yl as the random variable of sample variance of padded traffic’s PIAT at the 
low rate payload traffic. Substituting (4.41) into (4.48), we then derive Yl’s density 
function ( )yf
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Similarly, Yh is the random variable of sample variance of padded traffic’s PIAT at high 
rate payload traffic, and its density function ( )yf
hY
 is 
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To get the detection rate, we calculate the cross point yc of ( )yf lY  and ( )yf hY   
( ) ( )cYcY yfyf hl =  (4.51) 
After lengthy arithmetic operations, we have 
22
22
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2
log
lh
lh
l
h
cy σσ
σσ
σ
σ
−






=  (4.52) 
Now we use Chebynov inequality for the estimation of error rate if the adversary uses 
sample variance as the feature statistic. The distance from the mean of Yl to the cross 
point yc is denoted as Dl 
lcl YyD −=  (4.53) 
Substituting (4.44) and (4.52) into (4.53), we have 
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Denoting cl as the ratio of Dl to the standard deviation of Yl 
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l
l Y
D
c
var
=  (4.55) 
 
Substituting (4.45) and (4.54) into (4.55), we have 
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Similarly, denoting Dh as the distance from the mean of Yh to the cross point yc, 
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Then ch, the ratio of Dh and the standard deviation of Yh, can be calculated as follows 
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(4.58) 
 
When sample size n is big (>40), we can assume that a chi square PDF is symmetrical. 
Thus from Chebynov inequality, we can get the error rate eY 
2
2
1
2
1
22
hl
Y
cc
e
+
≤  
(4.59) 
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Thus, the detection rate vY can be calculated as 
Yv  =  Ye−1  (4.60) 
 ≥  
22 4
1
4
11
hl cc
−−  (4.61) 
Substituting (4.8), (4.56) and (4.58) into (4.61), we have 
1
1
−
−≥
n
C
v YY  (4.62) 
where 
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r
r
r
r
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Thus, we use the lower bound of vY as the estimation of the detection rate. Since that vY 
must be greater than 50%, we can get (4.39). The theorem is proved. 
In the following, we prove that vY  is an increasing function of r. That is, we need to 
prove that CY  in (4.63) is a decreasing function of r. For terms in (4.63), we have the 
following denotations 
( )
1
log
1
−
=
r
r
rCY  (4.64) 
( )
12 −
=
r
r
rCY  (4.65) 
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If CY1 is decreasing function and CY2 is an increasing function, then CY is a decreasing 
function. 
 We first prove that CY1  is a decreasing function. Let r=ex, we have 
( ) ( )
111 −
==
xyY
e
x
xcrC  (4.66) 
dr
dCY1
 
=  
dr
dc y1
 
(4.67) 
 =  
dr
dx
dx
dc y1
 
(4.68) 
 =  
( )21
1
−
−−
x
xx
er
xee
 (4.69) 
Since r>1, x>0, the denominator of (4.69) is greater than 0. We have the Taylor 
expansion of the numerator of (4.69) as follows 
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( ) 0!1
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!
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−
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nn
 (4.71) 
So 
01 <−− xx xee  (4.72) 
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Thus 
011 <=
dr
dc
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dC yY
 
(4.73) 
 
CY1 is a decreasing function in terms of r. 
 Now we prove CY2 is an increasing function of r. Let r = ex, we have, 
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and 
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Since r>1, x>0, the denominator of (4.75) is greater than 0. The Taylor expansion of the 
numerator of (4.75) is as follows 
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(4.77) 
we have 
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02 ≥−− xxx xeee  (4.78) 
So 
022 >=
dr
dc
dr
dC yY
 
(4.79) 
 
 
and CY2(r) is an increasing function of r. 
 Thus, we have proved that __ is an increasing function in terms of r. 
4.5.4. Proof of Theorem 4.4 
Theorem 4.4: Using sample entropy as the classification feature gives rise to an 
estimated detection rate 

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where CH  is calculated as follows: 
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and r is defined in (4.8).  
Proof: A normal distribution’s differential entropy can be calculated as 
_  
_    
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2
12log 2 +
=
piσH  (4.82) 
Here we use sample variance Y defined in (4.4) to estimate sample entropy H~  
2
12log~ +
=
YH pi  (4.83) 
To get sample entropy’s PDF, we first derive its distribution, 
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Differentiating two sides of (4.84), we get sample entropy’s PDF 
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pipipi
hhh
YH
eeYPefhf  (4.85) 
Denote Hl as the sample entropy of padded traffic’s PIAT at the low-rate payload traffic, 
and ( )hf
lH
~  as Hl’s PDF. Denote Hh as the sample entropy of padded traffic’s PIAT at 
the high-rate payload traffic, and ( )hf
hH
~  as Hh’s PDF. To get the detection rate, we need 
to calculate the cross point hc of ( )hf
lH
~  and ( )hf
hH
~  
( ) ( )'~~ cHcH hfhf hl =  (4.86) 
 
By lengthy arithmetic operations 
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(4.87) 
For the ease of estimation, we approximate sample entropy’s mean as follows 
( )
2
12log~ 2 +
=
piσHE  (4.88) 
That is, we approximate the entropy estimator in (4.83) as an unbiased one. 
 Now we use Chebynov inequality for the error rate estimation. The distance from the 
mean of Hl to the cross point hc is denoted as Dl 
lD  =  
2
12log
2
log2log
222
22
2
2
+
−
	
	







−






llh
lh
l
h
piσσσ
σσ
σ
σ
pi
 
(4.89) 
 =  
2
loglog 22
2
2
2
	
	







−






lh
h
l
h
σσ
σ
σ
σ
 
(4.90) 
 
Using Taylor expansion over (4.90) and by appropriate approximation, we get  
( )
n
H
2
1~
var ≈  (4.91) 
(4.91) is the same result as for the histogram-based entropy estimator in [32]. Denoting 
cl as the ratio of Dl to the standard deviation of hl 
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Similarly, denoting Dh as the distance from the mean of Hh to the cross point hc and ch as 
the ratio of Dh to the standard deviation of hh, we have 
lD  =  
2
1log2log
2
12log 22
22
2
2
2
+
	
	







−






−
+ lh
lh
l
h
h
σσ
σσ
σ
σ
pi
piσ
 
(4.93) 
 =  
2
log
log
2
2
2
22
	
	
	
	
	
















−
l
h
l
lh
σ
σ
σ
σσ
 
(4.94) 
n
c
l
h
l
lh
h
2
12
log
log
2
2
2
22
	
	
	
	
	
















−
=
σ
σ
σ
σσ
 
(4.95) 
 
So error rate is calculated as 
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where 
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Substitute (4.8) into (4.97), we have 
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Since 
HH ev ~~ 1−≥  (4.99) 
Substituting (4.98) into (4.96), we have 
n
C
v HH
~
~ 1−≥  (4.100) 
 
 In this section, we use the lower bound of Hv ~  as the estimation of the detection rate 
by sample entropy. Consider that detection rate must be greater than 50% and we can get 
(4.80) in Theorem 4.3. The theorem is proved. 
In the following we prove that Hv ~  is an increasing function in terms of r. That is, we 
need to prove that HC ~  is a decreasing function of r. Denote 
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( )
r
r
rCH log
1
1
−
=  (4.101) 
( )
12 −
=
r
r
rCH  (4.102) 
 
If CH1(r) in (4.101) and CH2(r) in (4.102) are increasing functions of r, HC ~  is a 
decreasing function of r. 
 We can see that CH1(r)=1/ CY1(r), where CY1(r) is defined in (4.64). Since CY1(r) is a 
decreasing function of r, CH1(r) is an increasing function r. CH2(r)=CY2(r),  where CY2(r) 
is defined in (4.65). We have proved that CY2(r) is an increasing function, so is CH2(r).  
 Thus Hv ~  is of r, where r>1. 
4.5.5. Proof of Theorem 4.5 
Theorem 4.5: When sample size n < M, a closed form of detection rate is as follows: 





 −
+
+−
−=
M
n
M
nM
vd 2
111 ε  (4.103) 
where error rate ε  = 1-v, and v can be calculated in (4.9), (4.10) or (4.12) when the 
adversary uses different features respectively. 
Proof: We assume that the user payload traffic rate is either low (denoted as ωl) or high 
(denoted as ωh) and the rate varies periodically with each rate lasting for half of the 
period. Recall how the adversary does the rate recognition. After getting a sample, she 
calculates its feature measurement s, whose PDF is p(s). Offline she obtains the decision 
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boundary d. For two class (ωl, ωh) classification problem, when s<d, the sample is 
classified as from ωl, otherwise from ωh.  
 First let’s check the elements of a sample of size n: there are m elements, X1, …, Xm, 
from ωl, whose RTTs satisfy N(µl, σl2), and the other elements, Y1, …, Yn-m, are from ωh, 
whose RTTs satisfy N(µh, σh2). Thus, the sample is {X1, …, Xm, Y1, …, Yn-m}.  
 For a sample consisting of packets from both ωl and ωh, the adversary should classify 
the sample as belonging to the rate whose packets show up first in the sample. Let’s 
calculate the error rate under this definition of a correct classification.  
 Define ωl,k as the event that  elements from ωl show up first, and  ωh,k as the event 
that k elements from ωh show up first, then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
==
+=
n
k
khkh
n
k
klkl errorerrorerror
1
,,
1
,,
PrPrPrPrPr ωωωω  (4.104) 
where 
( ) ( )dserror
klkl >= ,PrPr , ωω  (4.105) 
( ) ( )dserror
khkh >= ,PrPr , ωω  (4.106) 
 
Under the assumption of that n < M , we now check different cases of ωl,k and ωh,k for a 
sample of size n (<M). 
We have the following cases in which the payload traffic rate is classified as ωl: (M-
n+1) number of ωl,n, {ωl,n-1, ωh,1}, {ωl,n-2, ωh,2}, …, {ωl,1, ωh,n-1}. We have the following 
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cases in which the payload traffic rate is classified as ωh: (M-n+1) number of ωh,n, {ωh,n-1, 
ωl,1}, {ωh,n-2, ωl,2}, …, {ωh,1, ωl,n-1}. Thus 
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and 
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When we don’t consider the order of elements in a sample, 
nkwhenknhkl ≠= −     ,,, ωω  (4.109) 
Thus 
( ) ( ) nkwhenss knhkl ≠= −     ,PrPr ,,  (4.110) 
Noticing this fact, we have 
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Substitute (4.107) and (4.108) into (4.104) and reorder the elements, 
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( )errorPr  =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )khkhklkl errorerror ,,,, PrPrPrPr ωωωω  +  (4.112) 
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(4.113) 
 
Since we assume that the high-rate traffic and low-rate traffic have the same probability 
to happen, it’s easy to see that 
( ) ( )( )nhnl errorerror ,, PrPr21 ωωε +=  (4.114) 
 
where ε is the error rate for the static case of the two-traffic-rate classification. 
Obviously, 
( ) ( )knhkl errorerror −+ ,, PrPr ωω  =  ( ) ( )dsds knhkl <+> −,, PrPr ωω  (4.115) 
 =  1 (4.116) 
 
Substitute (4.114) and (4.116) into (4.113), 
( )
M
n
M
nM
error
2
11Pr −++−= ε  (4.117) 
Since success rate v = 1 - Pr(error), we have (4.15) instantly. 
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4.6. Summary 
In this section, we have evaluated the security of systems under active traffic analysis 
attacks. To demonstrate the threat from such attacks, we assume that the adversary uses 
ping probing to derive user payload traffic rates. We found that by measuring statistics 
of the round trip time of ping packets injected into security gateways, the adversary can 
achieve its objective to determine and track the payload traffic rates. This is true even if 
a powerful link padding scheme, such as VIT padding, has been used. 
 Of the possible statistics, sample entropy is an effective and robust feature statistic to 
explore the correlation between user payload traffic rate and the round trip time of 
probing ping packets. The reason for the success of the exploit is that payload traffic 
causes small disturbances to the RTT of ping packets. Moreover, the higher the user 
traffic rate, the larger this disturbance and hence a larger entropy. 
 Under the framework of statistical pattern recognition, we have formally modeled 
systems with different statistical features. Our empirical results match well with our 
theoretical analysis. Our framework can be easily extended to analyze other statistical 
analysis attacks. We have also conducted extensive experiments in various situations 
including a laboratory, campus networks, and the Internet. We have found that for 
campus networks, the ping probing attack can still achieve a high detection rate. This 
extensive empirical data consistently demonstrate the usefulness of our formal model 
and correctness of detection rate predicted by the closed-form formulae.  
  
107 
 To improve the system security, we have proposed a random delay method to 
counter the active probing attack. Our experiments and theories have shown the 
effectiveness of this scheme. 
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5. CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section, we study connectivity analysis attacks and their countermeasures. In 
particular, we focus connectivity analysis attacks against communication privacy in a 
wireless anonymous communication system. In this kind of attack, an adversary embeds 
a recognizable pattern of marks into wireless traffic flows by electromagnetic 
interference. We propose a new countermeasure based on digital filtering technology. 
 Concerns about privacy have gained more attention with the rapid growth and public 
acceptance of the Internet as a means of communication and information dissemination. 
Communication privacy has become necessary and legitimate in many scenarios, such as 
anonymous web browsing, E-Voting, and E-Commerce. In each of these scenarios, 
encryption alone cannot hide the communication relationship between users [11][21]. 
 Since Chaum [12] pioneered the basic idea of the anonymous communication system 
referred to as mixes for hiding the communication relationship between users, 
researchers have developed various anonymity systems for different applications. Guan, 
Fu, Xuan, Shenoy, Bettati, and W. Zhao [24][35] study the problem of preventing 
passive traffic analysis attacks in a mission critical system. In this section, we study how 
to hide communication relation from active traffic analysis attacks in a general (best-
effort) communication system. 
 Although a significant amount of effort has been made in wired networks, not 
enough attention has been paid to hide communication relationship in wireless 
environments. In this section, we consider a broad range of wireless networks, ranging 
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from networks with all links being wireless to hybrid wired and wireless networks. The 
wireless links can be either 802.11 (or its extensions) or Bluetooth. A wireless network 
may use existing mix techniques to provide anonymity for flow-based applications such 
as anonymous web browsing. We study three mix batching approaches, which are 
feasible for a flow-based wireless mix network and find that they are all susceptible to a 
new flow-level attack, which we call the flow marking attack. 
 The remainder of this section is organized as follows: We first introduce the wireless 
mix network model and adversary threat model. We then discuss flow marking attack 
and related issues and use experiments to evaluate its threat against communication 
privacy. Finally we develop a digital filter-based countermeasure to flow marking 
attacks and empirically prove its feasibility. 
5.1. Models 
In this section, we first present the model of mix network, and then describe the wireless 
mix network model used in this section. Finally, we introduce the threat model. 
5.1.1. Mix Network 
A traditional mix is a relay server for anonymous email communication [12]. It has a 
public key which senders use to encrypt messages. A mix operates as follows:  
1. The sender attaches the receiver address to the message and encrypts the entire 
package by using the mix’s public key;  
2. The mix collects a batch of messages (from different senders), and decrypts them 
to obtain the receiver addresses;  
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3. Finally the mix sends decrypted messages out in a rearranged order to their 
corresponding receivers. Batching and reordering are necessary techniques for a 
mix to reduce or eliminate the correlation between input messages and output 
messages. This kind of correlation may help an adversary to identify flow 
connectivity.   
 A mix network consists of multiple mix servers and can provide enhanced 
anonymity. In a mix network, senders route their messages through a series of mixes. 
Therefore, even if an adversary compromises one mix and discovers the correlation 
between its input and output messages, other mixes along the path can still provide the 
necessary anonymity [17][36][37]. Figure 17 illustrates the route selection for one 
message. A sender can choose different routes for each message or use one route for all 
her messages. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Mix Network 
 
 
 
Alice Bob Mix Network 
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 Message-based mix networks have been extended to flow-based networks for 
applications such as anonymous FTP, Web browsing, video and audio transmission, and 
many other low-latency applications. In the context of an IP network, the relay servers in 
Figure 17 form an overlay network and forward packets instead of messages.  
 Researchers have paid attention to attacks exploring packet-level correlation in 
anonymous communication systems. However, this is not sufficient and sometimes 
misleading, since most of today’s communications are flow based, with the majority 
using TCP. On the Internet, TCP flows constitute 60%~90% of the Internet traffic and 
UDP flows constitute 10%~40% [38][39], while all other protocols combined produce 
less than 5% traffic. On the Sprint IP backbone, new applications such as distributed file 
sharing and streaming media using TCP and UDP flows constitute 60% of the traffic on 
some links, while 30% is web traffic [40]. Traffic flows consist of rich features that can 
be explored to compromise anonymity systems. 
 Major differences between flow-based systems and message-based systems are as 
follows: 
1. Flow-based systems usually do not use dummy packets to pad the traffic in order 
to counter traffic analysis attacks. This is because dummy packets consume 
additional bandwidth and reduce efficiency [27]. 
2. Flow-based systems usually adopt static routing, i.e., one path per flow, in order 
to avoid the difficulty and overhead caused by using multiple routes for TCP 
connections and to prevent intersection attacks [37]. This practice coincides with 
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the design of several existing systems, including Crowds [41], Tor [42], and 
many others. 
3. Batching and reordering increase the (worst case) delay and are less preferred 
methods in flow based systems [23]. However, they may be necessary to counter 
packet-level timing correlation attacks. 
 In this section, we will investigate the security of flow-based systems with several 
different configurations. In [43], a complete list of batching strategies for a message-
based mix has been provided to counter message-level timing attacks. In our opinion, not 
all of them are appropriate for flow-based systems. For example, in a threshold mix, a 
mix can transmit the batch of packets only if the number of packets it collects has gone 
beyond a pre-defined threshold. This may cause serious problems for traffic of TCP 
flows, for instance, if the first (SYN) packet cannot be exchanged between a sender and 
receiver, the TCP flow cannot start, and hence, the entire mix network may not be stable. 
We select three batching strategies which appear to be feasible for a flow-based mix 
network. We summarize them in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Batching Strategies 
Strategy  
Index 
Name Adjustable  
Parameters 
Algorithm 
S0 Simple Proxy None No batching or reordering 
S1 
Timed Mix <t> If timer of period t fires, send all the 
packets queued in the last interval 
S2 
Stop-and-go Mix 
(Continuous Mix) 
<µ, σ2> Each packet is assigned a delay 
(deadline) satisfying a distribution with 
mean µ and variance σ2. A packet is 
sent out when its deadline is reached 
 
 
5.1.2. Wireless Networks 
In this subsection, we introduce the wireless network model used in this section. We 
note that there are two popular radio frequency (RF) technologies: IEEE 802.11 [44] 
(and its extensions such as 802.11a/b/g) and Bluetooth [45].  
 The IEEE 802.11 standards are widely adopted for wireless LAN (WLAN). Two 
types of WLAN are supported: one is the infrastructure mode and the other ad-hoc mode. 
In the infrastructure mode, a station acts as the access point (AP) centrally controlling 
the WLAN, and other mobile units communicate with the AP. A WLAN in the 
infrastructure mode is denoted as the basic service set (BSS). In the ad-hoc mode, an AP 
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does not exist. All mobile units (MUs) communicate within their transmission range. 
Ad-hoc routing protocols, such as DSDV [46], DSR [47], AODV [48], and many others, 
have been developed to extend the range and flexibility of ad-hoc networks. A WLAN in 
the ad hoc mode is also denoted as an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). An 
Extended Service Set (ESS) consists of multiple BSS/IBSS interconnected by access 
points and a distribution system, such as ethernet.  
 Bluetooth is a low cost, low-power, short range radio technology, originally designed 
as a cable replacement to connect devices such as mobile phone handsets, headsets, and 
portable computers. In Bluetooth, a group of two to eight Bluetooth units forms a 
piconet, sharing the same wireless channels (hopping sequence). In a piconet, any, but 
only one, unit can act as the master of the piconet, and the others are slaves. The master 
implements centralized control, and only communication between the master and slaves 
is allowed. The communication between two slaves is relayed via the master. Piconets 
can be interconnected and form a scatternet. Routing algorithms are proposed in [49] 
and many others for efficient communication between Bluetooth units (BU) in a 
scatternet. We focus on the standard of Bluetooth 1.1 because of its popularity. 
5.1.3. Wireless Mix Network 
Most anonymity communication systems are built as overlay networks. Thus, wireless 
units (MUs or BUs) can use mixing strategies discussed above and form a wireless mix 
network. This section assumes an ESS-like network with combined wireless (Bluetooth 
or 802.11) and wired links, in which any host can act as a mix. For example, in Figure 
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17, Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) can be mobile units, and they may communicate 
with each other through a wireless or wired mix network. 
5.1.4. Adversary Model 
 In the following, we summarize the adversarial assumptions considered in this 
section: 
1. The content of wireless communication between legal participants is protected by 
underlying encryption algorithms and immune to any attack. 
2. The adversary is an external one and therefore is not a legal participant of the 
wireless network. 
3. The adversary can passively eavesdrop on the communication session. We will 
show that eavesdropping wireless links can be easily realized in Section 5.3. 
4. The adversary can actively interfere with wireless networks by injecting 
interference traffic. We assume that the adversary uses a reasonably good 
directional antenna, allowing it to interfere with a selected victim with minimum 
disturbance to other wireless units [50][51][52]. 
5.2. Flow Marking Attack 
In this subsection, we introduce the flow marking attack and related issues. 
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5.2.1. Overview and Problem Definition 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the basic idea of a flow marking attack. Alice is communicating 
with Bob through a wireless mix network. The goal of the adversary is to find if Alice is 
communicating with Bob. A component of the adversary, interferer, first embeds a 
series of marks into Alice’s traffic by interfering with her link. Another component of 
the adversary, sniffer, then eavesdrops on Bob’s inbound traffic. The interferer and the 
sniffer communicate with each other and/or report their actions and findings to the 
adversary headquarter. If the sniffer discovers a pattern of marks in Bob’s traffic that is 
similar to that embedded by the interferer, the adversary can be sure that Alice is indeed 
communicating with Bob. 
 Thus, the general problem of the flow marking attack can be defined as follows: 
given a series of marks embedded into a flow, how can an adversary recognize them at a 
location somewhere along this path of the same flow? 
 Flow marking is a general technique and can be used in both wired and wireless 
networks. In wired networks, an adversary may explore TCP’s characteristics and use 
efficient denial of service approaches [53] to introduce marks. In wireless networks, an 
interferer can use electromagnetic interference to embed marks into traffic. This is the 
focus of this section. 
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Figure 18. Flow Marking Attack Scenario 
 
 
5.2.2. Issues of Flow Marking Attack 
From the viewpoints of both adversaries and defenders, there are four critical issues 
related to the problem of flow marking attacks: 
1. How can an adversary introduce marks into traffic flows and intercept traffic? 
2. How can an adversary effectively recognize if marks exist? 
3. How effective and efficient can the flow marking attack be in reality? 
4. How can we counter flow marking attack to minimize its effectiveness? 
We intend to address these issues in the following sections. 
5.3. Mark Embedding and Traffic Interception 
In this section, we discuss two key issues related to embedding marks into wireless 
traffic and intercepting wireless traffic.  
Interferer Sniffer 
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Mix 
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5.3.1. Overview of Radio Frequency Communication 
The physical layer of IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth is where interference may happen. 
IEEE 802.11 (and its extensions) has two different physical layers: frequency hopping 
(FHSS) layer and direct sequence (DSSS) layer5. Bluetooth uses FHSS. Both IEEE 
802.11 and Bluetooth use license-free ISM (industrial, scientific, and medical) radio 
frequency (RF) band from 2.4GHz to 2.5GHz. This band is divided into many channels. 
 In this section, we assume that an adversary uses a (laptop) computer equipped with 
an 802.11b (DSSS) PCMCIA card to apply the interference and hence to embed marks. 
Below we will focus on how the interference and interception can be realized. Related 
RF specifications are based on the regulation of American Federal Communications 
Commission. Please refer to [43] and [45] for RF regulations in other regions. 
5.3.2. Interfering with and Intercepting Wireless Communication 
It’s straightforward to interfere with and intercept 802.11 DSSS communication. 
There are 11 channels available, Channels 1 to 11. Hosts in the same channel can 
interfere with and intercept one another. Furthermore, only Channels 1, 6 and 11 are free 
of interference with each other, but adjacent channels may interfere with each other. 
In FHSS, the transceiver must be synchronized. With both 802.11 and Bluetooth, the 
ISM band is divided into 79×1MHz channels. The synchronized transmitter and receiver 
communicate on a series of channels, denoted as hopping pattern or hopping sequence 
and only remain on one channel for a predefined amount of time, denoted as dwell time.  
                                                 
5
 Today, most of 802.11 products use DSSS because of its high throughput. 
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 An 802.11 DSSS device can interfere with an 802.11 FHSS device since 802.11 
FHSS hopping sequence visits the DSSS channel and its adjacent channels regularly, 
hence potentially causing interference with each other. Intercepting the 802.11 FHSS 
traffic is not difficult since 802.11 FHSS has only 78 possible hopping sequences 
divided into 3 sets, and the adversary can know the whole hopping sequence by 
observing a small fragment of communication using an appropriate spectrum analyzer 
[54]. Then the adversary can adjust her own 802.11 FHSS device to synchronize with 
the victim 802.11 device and intercept the traffic. Of course, a full ISM band analyzer 
can easily intercept 802.11 FHSS traffic. 
In general, an 802.11 DSSS device can cause more interference to Bluetooth traffic 
than to 802.11 FHSS traffic since a Bluetooth device visits a fixed DSSS channel more 
frequently. Bluetooth’s hopping sequence has a dwell time of 625 microseconds, which 
corresponds to 1600 hops/s. The Bluetooth specification also requires that the hopping 
sequence distribute the hop frequencies equally over the 79 MHz during a short time 
interval. An 802.11 FHSS device’s hopping rate is often in the order of tens of hops per 
second. 
 It is still possible to intercept Bluetooth communication, although Bluetooth’s 
hopping sequence has a very long period length and does not show repetitive patterns 
over a short time interval. The method has a few defects. First, a piconet uses clear-text 
frequency hopping sequence (FHS) packets to exchange hopping sequence information 
between the master and slaves. An adversary can intercept FHS packets, synchronize 
with the master, and then eavesdrop on the communic
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have sophisticated Bluetooth listening devices to sniff the communication [55]. Again, a 
full ISM band analyzer can easily intercept Bluetooth traffic. 
5.4. Mark Recognition by Feature Frequency 
In this section, we address two issues of the flow marking attack: how to choose an 
effective pattern of marks and how to recognize marks. 
5.4.1. Effective and Efficient Marks 
An effective pattern of marks for flow marking attacks must demonstrate uniqueness. 
That is, the adversary can be certain of recognizing the same series of marks at one 
location as the one it introduces at another location. Because of the inherent nature of the 
Internet traffic, an arbitrary pattern of marks may not be effective and efficient for flow 
marking attacks.  
 In this section, we demonstrate that a periodic pattern of marks can be effective and 
efficient. That is, an adversary may use on-off traffic with a period of TI, denoted as 
interference period, to interfere with the victim traffic. During an on period, the 
interfering device transmits traffic at a rate as high as possible. This will reduce the 
available bandwidth for the victim traffic or disrupt packets of the victim traffic. During 
an off period, the interfering device becomes silent and the victim traffic gains the lost 
bandwidth. In this way, the adversary forces the victim traffic to adapt to the pattern of 
the interfering traffic and the victim traffic develops a replicate pattern. The adversary 
can choose a relatively unique interference period (compared with the background noise 
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traffic) to achieve a series of unique and strong marks within the network. We use an on 
period (approximately) equal to the off period, with each lasting for TI/2. 
 Depending on where interference is deployed in the path of the flow, the flow 
marking attack can have different effects on different types of flows. For TCP flows, the 
interference location can be flexible. The adversary can apply interference at any point 
along a TCP flow’s path (i.e., at the sender, an intermediate mix, an intermediate hop, or 
the receiver). Since TCP uses a loop-control mechanism [56], a TCP flow will 
demonstrate the similar periodicity along its path from the sender to the receiver. For 
UDP traffic, an adversary may have to deploy the attack as close to the sender as 
possible. We will focus on the effect of flow marking attacks on TCP flows because of 
their dominant status on the Internet. 
5.4.2. Flow Marking Attack Framework 
Now we summarize the framework of flow marking attacks based on pattern recognition 
[27] in Figure 2. Although we have introduced a similar framework in Section 1, we 
prefer to give a relatively detailed introduction in the current context for the ease of 
understanding the topic in this section.  
 Recall that in a flow marking attack, an adversary tries to discover if Alice is 
communicating with Bob by checking if the intentionally embedded pattern of marks 
exist in both Alice’s outbound traffic and Bob’s inbound traffic. The adversary has to 
decide what the pattern is and how to evaluate its existence.  
 Generally speaking, the goal of the pattern recognition process is to use classifiers to 
classify an unknown pattern as belonging to one of several existing pattern classes with 
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the help of a feature (or a vector of features). A classifier is trained from training data. In 
a flow marking attack, there are only two classes of events: 
ω0: Alice does not communicate with Bob 
ω1: Alice communicates with Bob 
(5.1) 
 Following the common practice, a pattern recognition system for flow marking 
attacks consists of two phases: (a) offline training phase and (b) online mark recognition 
phase. 
Figure 2 (a) is the flowchart of offline training phase. In the following, we will 
discuss each step of this phase for flow marking attacks illustrated in Figure 18. 
1. Collecting training data: The adversary emulates the entire system. The interferer 
interferes with Alice’s wireless link and dumps Alice’s interfered traffic or 
records the adversary’s own interference traffic. In general, an adversary may not 
achieve a perfect periodic interference and needs either her own or Alice’s traffic 
to derive the actual interference period. The sniffer intercepts Bob’s inbound 
traffic. 
2. Preprocessing training data: The collected data sample will be divided into 
segments, each of which contains packets within an interval, Ts, denoted as 
sampling interval. Thus, the number of packets in each segment forms a time 
series. The number of segments in the sample is denoted as sample size. This 
time series of packet counts is denoted as follows: 
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( ) { }NSI xxTTX ,,, 1 Κ=  (5.2) 
where TI is the interference period, N is the sample size and xi the number of 
packets in the ith segment. We denote sample length as the lasting time of the 
traffic sample and it is equal to NTs. 
3. Selecting feature from preprocessed training data: This is the key step for flow 
marking attacks. An appropriate feature extracted from X(TI, Ts) should represent 
the pattern of marks. 
In flow marking attacks, because the adversary artificially introduces periodicity 
into the victim traffic, when Fourier transform is applied to X(TI, Ts), strong 
amplitudes will be observed around the frequency of 1/TI, denoted as feature 
frequency. 
4. Selecting decision rule: If the sniffer can observe the feature frequency in Bob’s 
traffic, she can be sure that Alice is communicating with Bob. Here, we have an 
implicit assumption: without interference, the amplitude at the feature frequency 
is not significant. The adversary collects training traffic without applying the 
interference and derives this a priori knowledge of statistics of the amplitude 
during the offline training phase. 
 In this section, we assume the adversary uses the Bayes decision rule for flow 
marking attacks. To use the Bayes decision rule, the adversary collects training traffic 
without applying the interference and derives the a priori probability density function 
(PDF) of the amplitude at the supposed feature frequency. She collects data by 
emulating the flow marking attack and obtains the PDF of the amplitude at the feature 
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frequency. From these two statistics, the adversary generates the following Bayes 
decision rule: 
The amplitude at the feature frequency implies ω1  if 
___ __ 
_ _ ___ __ 
( ) ( )apap || 01 ωω ≥  (5.3) 
That is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0011 Pr|Pr| ωωωω apap ≥  (5.4) 
where a is the measured amplitude of the feature frequency, Pr(ωi) (i=0,1) is the a priori 
probability that Alice is communicating with Bob or not (set as 50% in this section), 
p(ωi|a) is the a posteriori probability that Alice is communicating with Bob when the 
collected sample has the amplitude at the feature frequency, p(a|ω0) is the PDF of the 
amplitude of the feature frequency conditioned when Alice and Bob are not 
communicating with each other and p(a|ω1) is the PDF of the amplitude of the feature 
frequency conditioned when Alice and Bob are communicating with each other. 
 From (5.4), the decision boundary d can be derived if we solve the following 
equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0011 Pr|Pr| ωωωω apap =  (5.5) 
Thus, the rule is,  
Alice is communicating with Bob if a>d. 
Refer to Figure 2 (b) for procedures in the online recognition phase. The procedure is 
similar to the offline recognition phase. The difference is that here, the network is 
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realistic. During the online recognition phase, the adversary interferes with Alice’s 
wireless traffic and measures the feature frequency of Bob’s inbound traffic. Then the 
adversary makes a decision by the Bayes decision rule based on the measured amplitude 
at the feature frequency. 
5.4.3. Detection Rate as Evaluation Criterion 
Detection rate is defined as the probability that an adversary correctly recognizes the fact 
that Alice is communicating with Bob. To derive the detection rate for the Bayes 
decision system, the adversary has to estimate a posteriori probability distribution of the 
feature frequency power amplitude in power spectrum for classes ω0 and ω1. We assume 
that the adversary uses a Gaussian kernel function based method to estimate density 
functions [28]. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Bayes Decision Rule for Flow Marking Attack 
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 As showed in Figure 19, once p(a|ω0) and p(a|ω1) are derived, detection rate can be 
calculated in (5.6). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
∞
∞−
+=
d
d
dssfPdssfPv 1100 ωωωω  (5.6) 
 
5.4.4. Selection of Interference Interval and Sampling Interval 
In flow marking attacks discussed above, there are two parameters: interference period 
TI and sampling interval Ts. These parameters are critical to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of a flow marking attack. 
We claim that the sampling interval should be smaller than half of the interference 
period. That is, 
2/Is TT <  (5.7) 
 This claim can be justified as follows. When we count packets in a sampling interval 
and derive the packet count time series in Step 3, as shown in Figure 2 (a) and Figure 2 
(b), this process is similar to a zero-order hold [57] sampling process. We know the 
feature frequency is 1/TI, which has to be preserved for the best effectiveness of flow 
marking attack. Nyquist’s sampling theorem [57] suggests that to preserve this feature 
frequency, the sampling rate should be at least twice of the feature frequency. That is, 
Is TT /2/1 <  (5.8) 
Thus, (5.7) is justified. 
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The selection of interference period TI is not arbitrary either. As discussed above, the 
interference traffic during the on period of the interference period has to decrease the 
victim traffic rate, and the off period has to be long enough so that the victim traffic can 
gain the lost bandwidth. Clearly, for 802.11 DSSS, 802.11 FHSS and Bluetooth, there 
are different requirements for choosing TI because of their different physical and 
protocol characteristics. 
 The interference period cannot be too long since in practice, a flow may only last for 
a short time. For example, the duration of a FTP session is determined by the 
corresponding file size.  
 Interference period is also related to the requirement of sample length for the 
effectiveness of flow marking attack. By the definition of a feature frequency, an 
adversary must sample for at least one complete cycle of interference. Otherwise, she 
could not recognize the feature frequency [57]. Thus, the sample length of NTs should be 
greater than the interference period, i.e., 
sI NTT ≤  (5.9) 
 
5.5. Evaluation of Flow Marking Attack  
In this section, we empirically show the failure of a wireless mix network under a flow 
marking attack (FMA) in a laboratory environment and discuss related issues. 
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5.5.1. Experiment Environment 
Figure 20 illustrates the experiment setup in the laboratory. It is a typical one-mix 
anonymous communication network with wireless links, i.e., an ESS-like wireless 
network. Alice uses FTP to download a file from Bob through a mix. To simplify our 
discussion, we assume that only Alice’s link is wireless, and she communicates with 
other parts of the network through a machine performing access-point-like functions. We 
also install NISTNet [58] on this access-point-like computer to simulate delay and other 
network dynamics when necessary. One computer acts as a noise generator to inject 
noise traffic. In this way, we can evaluate the impact of noise on the performance of 
flow marking attacks. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Experiment Setup 
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 Mixing strategies are implemented on the TimeSys/Real Time Linux operating 
system for its timer accuracy [29]. We integrate the mix control module performing 
batching and reordering functions into Linux’s firewall sub-system Netfilter [59], and 
firewall rules are used to specify what traffic should be protected.  
 We use WaveLAN silver PC card as 802.11 DSSS devices, Spectrum24 LA 3021 PC 
card as 802.11 FHSS devices, and Belkin Bluetooth PC card as Bluetooth devices. 
Wireless traffic and wired traffic is dumped by tcpdump [60]. Wireless channels can be 
changed by iwconfig [61]. 
 In our experiments, a timed mix timer has a period of 100ms. The stop-and-go mix 
assigns an exponentially distributed delay to packets with average delay of 25ms. This 
delay cannot be too long, otherwise it may cause a large number of packet reordering 
and hence seriously disrupt normal behavior of TCP. 
5.5.2. Failure of Mix Networks under FMA 
Figure 21 shows the power spectrum by 64-point FFT for a stop-and-go mix network 
with an 802.11 DSSS wireless link. We can see that the feature frequency, 2Hz (1/TI), 
has a strong amplitude compared to the case without flow marking attacks, in which 
every frequency component has roughly equal amplitudes. 
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Figure 21. Power Spectrum of 802.11 DSSS Traffic for Stop-and-go Mix 
 
 
 Figure 22 shows the relationship between detection rate and sample length for all the 
three mixing techniques in Table 1 and three types of wireless links. In all the 
experiments, interference period TI = 0.5s and sampling interval Ts = 0.1s. 802.11 DSSS 
and 802.11 FHSS links have a bandwidth capacity of 2Mbps while the Bluetooth link 
has a bandwidth capacity of 1Mbps.  
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Figure 22. Detection Rate by Flow Marking Attack 
(a) 802.11 DSSS 
(b) 802.11 FHSS 
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Figure 22. Continued 
 
 
 We have the following observations from Figure 22: 
1. A wireless anonymous communication system may completely fail under flow 
marking attacks. As sample length increases, a flow marking attack can achieve a 
detection rate of 100% in all cases as shown in Figure 22. 
2. An adversary only needs a few seconds of sampling to achieve a detection rate of 
100%. This shows that flow marking attacks can be effective and efficient for 
online piracy tracing even if an anonymous file exchange service is used on the 
Internet since most of the file downloading takes longer than a few seconds. 
(c) Bluetooth 
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5.5.3. Detection Rate vs. Different Wireless Links 
Figure 23 compares detection rate for the three different wireless links. Stop-and-go 
mixes are used in experiments. As we analyze above, since an adversary can use the 
same 802.11 DSSS channel to interfere with the victim 802.11 DSSS wireless link, she 
achieves the highest detection rate in this case. Because of a higher hopping rate, a 
Bluetooth FHSS link is more susceptible to the 802.11 DSSS interference than an 802.11 
FHSS link, where the Spectrum24 PC card has a hopping rate of 10 hops/s. The 
adversary achieves higher detection rate in the case of interfering with a Bluetooth link. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Detection Rate for Different Types of Wireless Links 
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 In the following, we concentrate on properties of flow marking attacks of 802.11 
DSSS wireless links. For other cases, we have similar results. 
5.5.4. Sample Length to Achieve Detection Rate of 95% 
Figure 24 shows the minimum amount of time an adversary takes to achieve a detection 
rate of 95% for each interference period. From Figure 24, we can see that at the 
interference period of 0.5s, it takes the adversary about 1.6 seconds to achieve a 
detection rate of 95%. This indicates that there is an optimal interference period by 
which the sample length is minimized. That is, flow marking attacks can be very 
effective and efficient when the adversary operates in the optimal mode.  
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Sample Length Required to Achieve Detection Rate of 95% 
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 We note that the curve is concave up. The reason is as follows: if the interference 
period is too small, a TCP flow does not have enough time to reduce the rate during 
interference and to increase the rate during the silent time of the flow marking attack. 
Thus, the introduced pattern would have a weak appearance in the TCP flow. It may take 
more time to effectively detect the pattern of marks. On the other hand, if the 
interference period is very long, from (5.9), we know the flow marking attack needs at 
lease one interference period of sample to be effective. Thus, the longer the interference 
period, the larger the sample length. Clearly, the large sample length is caused by the 
unnecessarily large interference period. 
5.5.5. Impact of Noise Traffic 
Figure 25 shows noise’s impact on the effectiveness of a flow marking attack. We use r 
to represent the ratio of the number of noise traffic packets to the number of TCP 
payload packets. The noise traffic is generated with an inter-arrival time satisfying a 
Pareto distribution with the shape parameter of 1.5 [62]. 
 We have the following observations: 
1. Noise traffic has a clear impact on the performance of a flow marking attack. We 
can see that as r increases, detection rate decreases. The reason is that noise 
traffic introduces randomness into the aggregated traffic, and the power spectrum 
at the feature frequency would have more randomly distributed energy with more 
noise traffic. This decreases detection rate. 
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2. Noise traffic’s impact on the flow marking attack is limited. We can see that an 
adversary may still achieve a detection rate of 100% even if r ≈ 5, which 
corresponds to a 60% utilization rate for Bob’s 10Mbps link. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Detection Rate vs. Noise Traffic 
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5.6. Countermeasures by Filtering 
5.6.1. Overview 
In this section, we develop possible countermeasures to flow marking attacks. Our idea 
is based on signal processing theory. That is, we use digital filters to filter out possible 
feature frequencies introduced by adversaries. 
 The filter-based countermeasure works as follows: 
1. We deploy filters at locations where traffic shaping and filtering is needed. 
2. The filter utilizes a periodic timer of period Tf to sample the traffic rate. It buffers 
packets arriving in its current timer interval, say the nth interval, and counts the 
number of packets, x(n), in this interval6. 
3. Then, we can calculate the required number, y(n), of packets we should transmit 
in order to filter out feature frequencies by using the following formula: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
==
−−−=
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(5.10) 
where M is the filter order, x(n - k) and y(n – k) are the number of input packets 
and output packets of the filter, respectively, during the past kth interval, and a(k) 
and b(k) are filter coefficients, which are discussed in 5.6.2. Please refer to [63] 
for general knowledge of the design of a recursive (IIR) filter specified in (5.10). 
4. The filter then acts depending on different values of x(n) and y(n): If x(n) ≥ y(n), 
the filter sends out y(n) payload (user) packets when the timer fires and holds the 
                                                 
6
 In fact, x(n) is the sum of incoming packets in the current interval and packets left over from the previous 
interval. Refer to Step 4. 
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remaining x(n)-y(n)  payload packets, which will be counted into the next round 
of incoming packets, i.e., x(n+1) = x(n+1) + x(n) - y(n). If x(n) < y(n), the filter 
generates y(n) - x(n) dummy packets and sends them out with x(n) payload 
packets; 
5.6.2. Selection of Filter Coefficients 
Filter coefficients have to be carefully chosen for the best performance in countering 
flow marking attacks. To achieve this objective, we first determine the possible feature 
frequency band (Fl, Fu), which should be filtered out. In reality, the interference 
frequency of an adversary is bounded due to the following reasons: It takes time for the 
victim traffic to respond to the interference and to reduce its rate. Time is also needed for 
the victim traffic to gain the bandwidth when the interference stops. This gives feature 
frequency an upper bound, Fu. Moreover, a traffic flow only lasts for a limited interval, 
for example, the duration of a FTP session is determined by the file size. This gives 
feature frequency a lower bound, Fl.  
 Then we set a sufficiently large filter order _ and use the yulewalk function from 
Matlab to derive the filter coefficients a(k) (k=0, …, M) and b(l) (l=1, …, M). The filter 
is of a band-stop type, as we just filter out the band of possible feature frequencies. The 
benefit is that details of traffic are kept and the number of dummy packets can be 
reduced. 
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5.6.3. Evaluation of Filter-based Countermeasure 
Figure 26 gives the detection rate when we put a filter of Tf = 0 on MicroAP in Figure 20, 
where a stop-and-go mix is used. The interference period is 0.5s and the filter has an 
order of 20. 
 We can see that detection rate approaches 50%, which is the minimum value in a 
two-class pattern recognition. So traffic filtering can be used as an effective 
countermeasure for flow marking attacks in combination with mixes in a wireless mix 
network. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Detection Rate with Filter-based Countermeasure 
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5.7. Summary 
This section studies the performance of an anonymous wireless communication system 
under flow marking attacks. Detection rate is defined as the probability that the 
adversary finds the communication relationship of “Alice” and “Bob”: whether or not 
they are communicating with each other. We show that it takes only a few seconds for an 
adversary to achieve a detection rate of 100%. This is, in a wireless environment, flow 
marking attacks can be very effective and efficient even if traditional mix technologies 
are used. 
 To counter flow marking attacks, we introduce a countermeasure that uses digital 
filters to filter out the suspect band of feature frequencies. Our filter is an IIR recursive 
one. We empirically demonstrate the success of this digital filter based countermeasure. 
With a filter deployed in a wireless mix network, the detection rate can be maintained 
near the minimum value of 50%. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we study traffic analysis attacks and their countermeasures. Traffic 
analysis attacks are aimed at deriving critical information by analyzing the statistics of 
traffic flows. This kind of attack challenges the design of traditional systems where 
encryption is typically used as the main method for protecting security and privacy. 
However, it is obvious that encryption alone cannot protect many important 
characteristics of network traffic that may be mission critical and require protection. We 
focus on studying the threat from link-load analysis attacks and connectivity analysis 
attacks and relevant countermeasures to them. 
 Link padding is to counter traffic analysis attacks. We introduce statistical pattern 
recognition as a formal framework for analyzing the security of communication systems 
under traffic analysis attacks. We find that the commonly used CIT padding still can 
reveal the payload traffic rate if an adversary measures statistics such as sample entropy 
and sample variance of packet inter-arrival times. We discover that VIT padding can be 
very effective against these kinds of passive link load analysis attacks.  
Using the framework of statistical pattern recognition, we also study the security of 
VIT padding under active link-load analysis attacks. To demonstrate the threat from such 
attacks, we consider ping probing attacks aimed at deriving user payload traffic rates. 
We found that by measuring statistics of the round trip time of ping packets injected into 
security gateways, the adversary can break the system, track the user payload traffic 
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changing pattern, and discover exactly the payload traffic rate that security gateways 
attempt to protect. This is true even if a powerful method such as VIT padding is used.  
In addition, we study connectivity analysis attacks, which are aimed at discovering 
the flow connectivity between a pair of users. We find that a class of active connectivity 
analysis attacks, namely flow marking attacks, can be both effective and efficient in 
wireless networks. We propose filter-based approaches to counter these kinds of attacks. 
Our experimental data shows that our approach can help to protect flow connectivity 
information when the system is under connectivity analysis attacks. 
In this dissertation, not only do we have experimental results about the above attacks 
and countermeasures in a laboratory environment, but we also theoretically analyze 
these attacks and countermeasures and perform extensive experiments on campus 
networks and the Internet to further validate our findings. We believe that our 
methodology will provide a solid foundation for studying the entire spectrum of traffic 
analysis attacks and their countermeasures. 
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